The war diaries of the High Command of the German Armed Forces (Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, KTB OKW) in the years 1940-1945 were kept by the Office of National Defense at the Headquarters of the Operations of the German Military Forces (Abteilung Landesverteidigung im Wehrmachtführungsstabamt). These war diaries describe strategies, battles, troop movements, front lines, objectives, operational decisions and war plans and assessments of combat situations by the top leadership of the German military forces.
Translated by Ana Kolevica, edited by Saimir Lolja
The Secretary of the War Diaries at the High Command of the German Armed Forces was Helmuth Greiner until March 1943 and then Percy Ernst Schramm. In the years 1961-1965, the war diaries were compiled by historians and published by the publishing house Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, Frankfurt am Main. The main historian was Percy Ernst Schramm and his assistant historians, respectively by volume were as follows:
Hans-Adolf Jacobsen: Volume I, 1517 pages, period 01.08.1940 – 31.12.1941, published 1965.
Andreas Fritz Hillgruber: Volume II 1-2, 1477 pages, period 01.01 – 31.12.1942, published 1963.
Walther Hubatsch: Volume III 1-2, 1673 pages, period 01.01 – 31.12.1943, published 1963.
Percy Ernst Schramm: Volume IV 1-2, 1976 pages, period 01.01.1944 – 22.05.1945, published 1961.
These four-volume (originally eight-volume) war diaries are still today one of the most important factual sources for historical scholarship covering World War II. Next, only the parts where Albania was written will be presented, translated into Albanian, according to the published volumes.
Volume I
August 1, 1940 – December 31, 1941
A. Introduction
III. War Plan and Aims 1939-1941: An Overview
Page 71E. In the war in the Balkans (April 1941), Hitler had less territorial goals, much more he aimed to secure strategic and economic interests. In no way did he want to allow the establishment of the English in Greece as well as the threat of the oil fields in Romania which were very important for his war. He also thought that in that way he helped Italy to maintain its positions in Albania.
B. War Diary
Page 42 – 21.08.1940. The Adriatic Sea should be completely under Italian power, the sphere of influence in the Balkans should be expanded. For this, it is thought to destroy Yugoslavia, to create an independent Croatia but under the influence of Italy, to enlarge Albania by taking the areas inhabited by Albanians in the south of Yugoslavia and in Greece, as well as the union with Corfu and perhaps with some other islands in the sea John.
Page 81 – 18.09.1940. According to the announcements of the Italian general staff of the ground troops given to the military attache in Rome, the 49th and 51st Divisions have been sent to Albania; Division 30.09.1940 will also be sent until 29.
Page 110 – 05.10.1940. According to an announcement dated 24.09.1940 (171/40 Top Secret) of the military attaché in Rome, the Italian army now consists of 74 divisions, of which 51 are located in the homeland, 8 in Albania, 14 in Libya and 1 in the Dodecanese islands.
Page 130 – 28.10.1940. The foreign section announces that after a note was delivered to the Greek government by the Italian envoy in Athens at 03:00, today at 06:00 in the morning Italian troops entered Greece from Albania.
Page 138 – 30.10.1940. The political action planned for the beginning of September was not undertaken, but during this month, the XXVI Italian Corps, located in Albania, was reinforced with 3 Divisions. ... On 27.10.1940 at 21:00, Count Ciano officially informed the responsible German person, the nobleman Bismarck, that the following day at 03:00 the ultimatum for the occupation of strategic points will be delivered to the Greek government and at 06 :00 the introduction of Italian troops from Albania to northern Greece would begin. The purpose of this operation is the occupation of Corfu, the entry from Ioannina to the Gulf of Patras to occupy the islands of Lefkas, Kefalonia and Zante, as well as the march to Athens and Thessaloniki. The leadership is in the hands of the general of the XXVI corps, Viscount Prasca. Since 2 of the 9 divisions located in Albania are needed for the defense of the border with Yugoslavia, it is thought that the Italian advantage will not be so great and in the case of a great Greek resistance, quick success should not be counted. ... Due to bad weather conditions, Italian planes stationed in Albania cannot enter.
Page 157 – 07.11.1940. From the Italian aviation forces that started from Albania, 56 fighter planes, 120 fighter planes and 17 reconnaissance planes were used in Greece.
Page 159 – 08.11.1940. Foreign news: news from General von Rintelen, according to which reinforcements are being sent to Albania (4 Italian divisions).
Page 162 – 09.11.1940. Due to difficult transport conditions in Albania, it will be a long time before reinforcements reach the front. …. A quick success of the Italians can no longer be counted on. They are trying to fix what they did not prepare before.
Page 163 – 09.11.1940. The advantage of conquering northern Greece has several downsides. By bringing another country into the war, the war was expanded and spread to the Balkans, which Germany has tried to avoid until today. The Italian army is thus bound in one direction more. The English thus have one more ally and a point of land support, which strengthens their position in the eastern Mediterranean. The possibilities of their action against the Italian armies in Libya and Albania have increased.
Page 172 – 13.11.1940. The military attaché in Rome sends information that the chief of staff in the Italian defense ministry, Colonel Sorice, has given him regarding the situation in Albania.
Page 182 – 19.11.1940. The situation in Albania: complicated.
Page 183 – 20.11.1940. According to a telegram dated 18.11.1940 of the military attaché in Rome, the Italian general staff judges the situation in the Albanian-Greek area, after the withdrawals in some parts of the front and the sending of reinforcements, as stable. The situation, however, has worsened because the Albanian battalion went over to the side of the Greeks. …. General Marras was yesterday at the German Chancellery and asked for 3000 trucks to take to Albania from Yugoslavia in exchange for 3000 Italian trucks.
Page 188 – 25.11.1940. The talks with the Italians regarding the trucks to Albania reached some conclusion.
Page 201_202 – 05.12.1940. According to report no. 429 dated 03.12.1940, the Italian army stationed in Albania led by General Soddu is part of the XXI Army (General Geloso in Tepelena with about 9 Divisions), of the IX Army (General Vercellino in Elbasan with 6 Divisions) and reserve ground forces ( 1 motorized division, 2 cavalry regiments). As further reinforcements, 2 Divisions are ready in southern Italy (See Addendum to the Land Forces Command Organization Report for East and West). The situation seems stable with the complete withdrawal of the Italian divisions to the new defense line, which stretches from the Kallama river to Raveni-Koshovicë-Përmet - west of the Albanian-Greek border. In Albania, order and peace are maintained by powerful Italian police forces.
Page 204 – 05.12.1940. Hitler assesses the situation as follows: The situation in Albania is not clear. If the Italians are defeated even more, then there is a possibility of losing all of Albania. Yugoslavia will apparently postpone its decisions until the situation in Albania is clarified. The most important factor in the Balkans is Russia, which is increasing its influence in Bulgaria after all of Romania is blocked. It follows that any weakness anywhere in Europe will lead to the advance of the Russians.
Page 205 – 05.12.1940. The withdrawal of Yugoslavia from the side of the axis powers is desirable and possible even if the Italian front in Albania does not advance... Hitler sees no possibility of sending troops to Albania.
Page 209 – 05.12.1940. The dire situation of the Italian troops in Albania and fierce Greek attacks.
Page 213 – 06.12.1940. Hitler is worried about the situation in Albania.
Page 218 – 07.12.1940. General Badoglio resigns apparently because of the losses in Albania.
Page 219 – 08.12.1940. The Italian ambassador in Berlin appeared on 07.12.1940 to Hitler and described the situation in Albania in the darkest colors.
Page 225 – 11.12.1940. The military attaché in Rome announces that General Cavallero, who has just returned from Albania, announces on 09.12.1940 that the crisis in Albania has not yet passed, but it is hoped that the situation will improve.
Page 226 – 11.12.1940. In both conversations, the situation in Albania is presented, not as dramatic as it has been until today.
Page 230 – 14.12.1940. Further Greek attacks in Albania.
Page 232 – 16.12.1940. Furthermore, a second group of transporters has been sent to Italy for the purpose of transporting troops and supplies to Albania. ….. Strong attack by the Greeks against the left wing of the Italian IX Army.
Page 237 – 18.12.1940. Due to the stable situation of Italian troops in Albania, it will no longer be necessary to send a second "Ju52" transport troop to Italy.
Page 241 – 20.12.2014. The situation in Albania three weeks ago was so dramatic that it had to be considered equal to a heavy defeat. Now the front is stable, it is hoped that it will hold. …. Snow storms in Albania.
Page 243 – 244 – 28.12.1940. The Italian military attaché in Berlin says that although the Greeks rarely attack with more than 1-2 battalions, it is not a question of the Italian army maintaining the front in Albania and rather it is withdrawing into the ongoing war. He is of the opinion that the entry into the war of even one German regiment would make the front held, especially because of the extraordinary action on the morale of the Italian soldiers but also on the Greek ones.
Page 245 – 246 – 04.01.1941. The military attache in Rome announces in writing (No. 6/41 Top Secret Top Priority) that General Guzzoni has informed on 03.01.1941 that General Cavallero has taken command of the troops in Albania instead of General Soddu who has fallen ill. He welcomes the German willingness to send troops with tanks to Libya and a division of soldiers to Albania, as well as weapons and equipment from the contingent of spoils of war. He prays that the division of soldiers be ready to be sent.
General Guzzoni describes the situation in Albania as follows: In Albania, another powerful Greek attack is expected either in the coastal area of Vlora or in the valley of the Osum river in the direction of Berat. It is hoped that that attack will be met by the Italians.
Page 251 – 08.01.1941. No decision has yet been taken on the introduction of German troops into Albania.
Page 252 – 08.01.1941. Since 10.12.1940, 16 [Italian] soldiers have been sent to Albania with Ju-000 carriers.
Page 254 – 09.01.1941. Hitler talks about the situation in Albania and says that if German troops are to enter there, then they must be powerful enough to strike from the back the Greek forces that will try to block Thessaloniki. But first the German forces will have to advance in Albania. For this, a cooperation of German and Italian forces as well as a unit with several powerful tanks is necessary. It would not be wrong for this combined force to start before the XII [German] Army arrived.
The Commander of the Land Army requests permission to begin collecting the necessary data on the situation in Albania and sets as a precondition for success the exercise of sufficient influence over the Italian command in Albania, so that the Italians can begin the attack simultaneously with the German forces .
Page 260 – 10.01.1941. Since 10.12.1940, 52 [Italian] soldiers and 17 tons of [material] have been taken to Albania with Ju-000 airplanes. General von Rintelen goes to the Albanian front. Data on the deployment of Italian troops in Albania. .... To prepare the first Mountain Division for Albania.
Page 261 – 11.01.1941. To prepare a German Corps to send to Albania, which includes 1 Mountain Division and a tank force. They will support the Italian troops in case of crisis as well as for the possible attack and the breach of the Greek front at important points. In addition, they will have the task of supporting from the back the frontal attack of the XII Army [commanded by General Wilhelm List] to open the strait west of Thessaloniki. The dispatch of German troops by ships still in the Mediterranean or by the group of Ju-52 transport planes to Foggia must have been carried out as soon as possible before the transport to Libya began.
Page 263 – 13.01.1941. Yesterday Captain Bürkner announced that the Italians agree with sending intelligence officers to Albania and Libya. Colonel Jodl's point of view on the situation in Albania based on the report of General-Colonel Rintelen. Final dispatch of troops to Albania only when a balance of forces has been achieved. Therefore, apparently, they want this simultaneous transport of troops to Albania and Libya.
Page 265 – 15.01.1941. Albania: Inconvenient frontline on the coast. ... Report of General-Colonel Rintelen about the conversation with Guzzoni on 13.01.1941 about the situation in Albania. ... Reconnaissance troops were launched in Albania and Libya.
Page 266 – 15.01.1941. The High Command of the Land Forces announces that the reconnaissance headquarters with Colonel Jodl and 4 other officers has left for Albania.
Page 267 – 18.01.1941. The head of the National Defense Office (ZMK) at the Military Forces Operations Headquarters (Sh.Op.FU) goes to Berchtesgaden on 17.01.1941 and reports to the commander of the Military Forces Operations Headquarters at the Imperial Office in the morning of 18.01.1941 Berchtesgaden. He submits the organization of the troops expected to be sent to Albania and Libya as well as the transport program for these troops.
Page 268 – 18.01.1941. The commander of Sh.Op.FU accepts the opinion of the commander of ZMK to give the operations in Libya and Albania respectively the names "Luledielli" and "Lily of the Alps". The orders for the relevant army commands were issued on 20.01.1941.
Page 270 – 20.01.1941. The "Lily of the Alps" operation, which envisages the introduction of troops into Albania, cannot be carried out according to plan, because the Italians need to use the capacities of the Albanian ports in full to send their reinforcements. The new decision will be made at the beginning of March. If then the introduction of German troops will be questioned again, then it will be done on a reduced scale.
Page 272 – 22.01.1941. The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces [General Wilhelm Keitel] sends his notes from the conversation with the Italian General Guzzoni at Berchtesgaden on 19.01.1941 as well as a summary of the conclusions of Hitler's talks with Ducen at the Berghof on 20.01.1941.
General Guzzoni, in conversation with the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, assesses the situation as follows: In Albania, the most important war for Italy takes place. The front there has not yet been strengthened, but the present line will be held at all costs against Greek attacks, and there is no possibility of Vlona or Berat falling into the hands of the Greeks.
There are now 21 Italian divisions in Albania and the intention is to send there 3 more from Italy to create a group of 10-12 divisions in the northern wing of the army (which will include the 3 divisions mentioned above and 4 Alpine divisions). The group will be ready to attack only after two and a half months, because faster transportation of three Divisions and refreshment of other Divisions is not possible. The attack of this group is planned in the direction of Korca, from here in the direction of Erseka to destroy the northern Greek front and to continue in the direction of Follorina when the supply line through Korca is secured. The present intention to carry out a limited-purpose coastal attack has been abandoned.
Page 273 – 22.01.1941. The attitude of the commander of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (KSFA) regarding the assessment of General Guzzoni is given: It is almost impossible for the Italians to prepare the necessary troops for an attack in Albania at the right time. Therefore, Italian support for the German attacks launched from Bulgaria against Greece should no longer be counted.
Page 274 – 22.01.1941. The Italians call the sending of German troops to Albania desirable but not necessary.
Page 275 – 22.01.1941. Therefore, it makes no sense to send troops to Albania now. If the front remains there without moving, there would be undesirable psychological consequences. If troops are brought in, then the war would start prematurely in the south-east.
Page 280 – 25.01-.1941. Entry of Greek troops into Albania.
Page 289 – 29.01.1941. There are 24 Italian Divisions in Albania.
Page 290 – 30.01.1941. The situation in Albania seems to be stable.
Page 292 – 31.01.1941. Report dated 29.01.1941 of General Rintelen. Guzzoni's data on Albania and Libya.
Page 305 – 05.02.1941. The German troops in Libya and Albania, just in case there will be troops there, will be tactically put directly at the service of the Italian commands. These troops are under the command of the Commander of the Ground Forces who, through the liaison officer, is connected with the Italian command on the ground.
Page 307 – 06.02.1941. The III Special Purpose Fighter Squadron at Foggia will be solely under the command of X Air Corps to supply German ground troops in North Africa. It is necessary to make a new planning of Italian transports to Albania in time.
Page 322 – 13.02.1941. There are no significant military operations in Albania.
Page 324 – 14.02.1941. The main point of support of the British air force is Crete. From there, with the help of other airports in Greece, strikes are carried out in Albania.
Page 326 – 15.01.1941. Since the situation on the front in Albania is stable and in this season of the year no significant success is expected in the event of an attack, even with German troops, then no German troops will be kept on standby for this region.
Page 343 – 04.03.1941. General von Rintelen's letter on the conversation with Guzzoni. General Cavallero will start on 06.03.1941 a small attack in Albania. Ducia, who is now in Albania, has instead ordered an attack by the XI Army on the 8th or 9th on the town of Gjirokastra. Unverified news about the landing of 2 English divisions in Greece.
Page 346 – 06.03.1941. General von Rintelen has been ordered to be very withdrawn. For this reason, the Italians have postponed their attack on Albania.
Page 351 – The infantry division reached the Bulgarian-Greek border. In Albania, the attack began on 09.03.1941 with the XXV, VIII and IV Corps of the ground forces. Italian attacks in the morning of 09.03.1941.... The Italian attack in Albania under the command of the Duce.
Page 353 – 12.03.1941. Few successes of the Italians in Albania.
Page 356 – 13.03.1941. The Italian attack on Albania ends.
Page 363 – 18.03.1941. There are 25 Italian divisions in Albania compared to 16 Greek divisions. According to General von Rintelen, the striking power of the Greeks is diminishing. The impression is created that the British are landing troops in Greece and apparently in the northern part of the Peloponnese.
Page 365 – 21.03.1941. Signing of the agreement with Yugoslavia. A small liaison headquarters of the ground forces headed by Colonel Fretter-Pico will go to Albania.
Page 371 – 31.03.1941. The situation of the Italians in Albania before the beginning of the operations against Yugoslavia seems difficult. The Italians prepare 1 tank division and 2 infantry divisions near the Yugoslav border. 3 British divisions in Greece. Abyssinia was lost.
Page 373 – 01.04.1941. Two Italian divisions are sent to Albania.
Page 374 – 02.04.1941. Greek attacks in Albania.
Page 374 – 03.04.1941. Isolated Greek attacks in Albania. 3 Divisions from Armata XI, 1 Division from Armata IX, 2 Divisions from Italy are sent to protect the eastern and northern borders. Ducia wants German officers for these Divisions.
Page 375 – 05.04.1941. General von Rintelen meets on 03.04.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX in Albania with General Cavallero; reports on the aims and groupings of the Italian forces.
Page 376 – 07.04.1941. The connection with Albania and Libya has been interrupted.
Page 380 – 14.04.1941. Movement of withdrawal of Greek troops in Albania.
Page 380 – 15.04.1941. Complete withdrawal of Greeks from Albania.
The diary ends on December 30, 1941.
ANNEX
Page 948 – 22.08.1939. Hitler's speech at the Berghof: ...In the Balkans, since the invasion of Albania by Italy in Easter 1939, there has been a balance of power.
Page 1181 – 28.10.1940. Time 05:30. Beginning of the Italian attack on Greece. The IX and XI Armies participate (7 Divisions, of which an Alpine Division and a Tank Division; 1 Division to secure the border with Yugoslavia). The Greek army (General Papagos) has mobilized around 300 people. Italian air strikes against Greek airports, including the Tatol airport near Athens, as well as the ports of Preveza and Patras. 000 war planes, 56 fighter planes, 120 reconnaissance planes in Albania; 17 fighter planes, 112 fighter planes and 24 reconnaissance planes in Puglia [Italy].
Page 1182 – 09.11.1940. General Soddu becomes commander-in-chief of the Italian troops in Albania. ….. A group of English ships (3 cruisers and 2 strike ships) attacked the Italian ships returning from Albania and sank 4 transport ships with a carrying capacity of 16938 tons.
Page 1183 – 14_22.11.1940. The Greek attack reaches its peak with the capture of Korça in Albania on 21.11.1940.
Page 1184 – 26.11.1940. Due to the losses in Albania, Mussolini gives the order to remobilize the Italian army.
Page 1186 – 10.12.1940. KSFA order to deploy X Airborne Corps to Sicily and Southern Italy. Admiral Canaris [head of German military intelligence – St. ed.] asked the Hungarian ambassador in Madrid to act as a mediator for peace with Greece. If Greece were to return to a neutral position, they would be allowed to keep the occupied parts of Albania.
Page 1187 – 19.12.1940. The English warships "Warspite" and "Valiant" fire at Vlona in Albania.
Page 1188 – 28.12.1940. Italy seeks German support in Albania. Hitler at first considers sending an Alpine Division but then gives up.
Page 1188 – 30.12.1940. General Count Cavallero takes command of the Italian troops in Albania instead of General Soddu who has fallen ill. There are now 16 Italian Divisions in Albania compared to 13 Greek Divisions.
Page 1196 – 09.03.1941. The beginning of an Italian attack on the Albanian front.
Page 1197 – 16.03.1941. The Italian attack started on 09.03.1941 in Albania finally suffered defeat.
Page 1202 – 14.04.1941. The beginning of the withdrawal of Greek troops fighting in Albania.
Page 1203 – 21.04.1941. General Wilhelm List accepts the capitulation of the Greek troops in Larissa. SS-German troops coming from the south from Greece and the Italians coming from the north from Albania meet at the Albanian border.
Volume II
1 January – 31 December 1942
Page 446 – 24.06.1942. Chief of Staff for Southeast Europe Major General Foertsch arrives for talks at Hitler's headquarters. At his request the instruction is given to the German general attached to the Italian general staff to influence there so that the liaison officer of the Italian high command 11 [in Greece] attached to the German staff for south-eastern Europe is also given the task of the liaison officer for the high command 9 (Albania) and for the military government of Montenegro.
Volume III
January 1, 1943 – December 31, 1943
Page 275 – 03.04.943. Description of the situation in Croatia: ...Communist brigades IV and V, about 2500 people, are trying to enter Albania. The Chetniks have taken up a position on the Gacko-Bileça road (37 km north-east of Dubrovnik) facing north-west.
Page 286 – 05.04.1943. Albania: It is said that in isolated countries there are demonstrations by Albanians in support of Germany against the Italians. 15 km east of Valona (coastal town 100 km south-southwest of Tirana) attack against an Italian convoy: 10 dead, 19 wounded, 103 missing.
Page 301 – 08.04.1943. Italian Occupied Area: According to an intelligence report, 10 communists are in an area west of Foça [in eastern Bosnia] and will try to enter Albania.
Page 316 – 09.04.1943. Italian occupied area: In the Gacko area [in eastern Bosnia] a powerful enemy force is being assembled with the intention of entering Albania.
Page 336 – 15.04.1943. Two attacks on Italian occupation troops in southern Albania. A support point was captured and the barracks burned.
Page 341 – 16.04.1943. The Italians undertake with numerous forces, in the area 40 km southeast of Valona, a sweep of the center of bandits there.
Page 346 – 17.04.1943. The purges of the Italians in the southeast of Valona continue.
Page 351 – 18.04.1943. Albania: The purges of the Italians in the south continue.
Page 360 – 20.04.1943. The purges of the Italians in the south of Valona continue. Several communist centers were destroyed and a cannon was captured.
Page 423 – 03.05.1943. On 29.04.1943, the Albanian government resigned.
Page 454 -09.05.1943. Fighting north of Valona, 10 enemy killed, few weapons captured.
Page 502 – 19.05.1943. In the northeast of Leskovik (southeastern border of Albania), Italian battalions are attacked by strong bandit troops. Italian losses: 3 dead, 25 wounded. 50 enemies killed.
Page 544 – 27.05.1943. Mediterranean Front in the Southeast: A document found in the headquarters of Dragoljub "Drazha" Mihailovic proves that his movement has extensive connections with the insurgent movement in Albania. [In the memoirs of the German ambassador to Albania during the war, Martin B. Schliep, Muharrem Bajraktari of the Luma area near Kukës is mentioned in connection with Dragoljub "Drazha" Mihailovic. - St. ed.]
Page 552 – 28.05.1943. Albania: Since 01.06.1943 [will be] an Italian military group based in Tirana. Commander General Rossi.
Page 558 – 29.05.1943. Albania: On 26.05.1943, a bomb attack against two pro-Italian Albanian leaders. Bandits set fire to the mines southwest of Lake Ohrid and take the workers with them.
Page 581 – 02.06.1943. Albania: An attack by bandits (200 people) on an airport is faced.
Page 587 – 03.06.1943. Albania: Night flights south-north of the enemy, return from the south.
Page 592 – 04.06.1943. Albania: There are no special events.
Page 613 – 08.06.1943. Albania: At dawn on 07.06.1943, numerous enemy flights.
Page 648 – 15.06.1943. The Italian troops of the IV Corps are undertaking sweeps against the insurgents in the area south of the Tirana-Durres line. The insurgents have suffered heavy losses.
Page 653 -16.06.1943. 85 enemies killed during the Italian sweeps in the southern area of the Tirana-Durres line.
Page 658 – 17.06.1943. Albania: 35 enemies killed during the Italian purges; two machine guns were captured.
Page 664 – 18.06.1943. 64 enemies killed during the Italian purges in the southern area of Tirana-Durres, nearly 60 arrested, a small amount of weapons was captured. In the east of Tirana, a militia bodyguard was attacked. In the north of Valona (105 km southeast of Tirana) a gendarmerie barrack was attacked by a communist troop of 200 people. The gendarmes were taken prisoner.
Page 685 – 22.06.1943. Greece: At dawn on 22.06.1943, the Ioannina-Athens, Preveza (75 km south of Ioannina) and Albania telephone connection was completely cut off due to sabotage.
Page 690 – 23.06.1943. During the fighting in the north-east of Albania and in the north-west of Krusheva (120 km east of Tirana) 22 enemies were killed. South of Dibra (60 km northeast of Tirana) an Italian convoy and bodyguard were attacked. The Italians had losses. The general conclusion of the purges in the area south of Tirana-Durres: 69 enemies killed, 198 arrested.
Page 697 – 24.06.1943. Communist attack on an Italian company and a mine east of Tirana.
Page 708 – 26.06.1943. Successful attack by Italian troops on a nest of bandits west of Korça (120 km southeast of Tirana).
Page 713 – 27.06.1943. In the north-west of Tepelena (110 km southeast of Tirana) a group of bandits is destroyed with the help of the Italian air force.
Page 717 – 28.06.1943. During the fighting in the north-west of Tepelena (110 km southeast of Tirana) 102 Italians were killed, and the losses of the enemy are considered high. During the purges in the area of Berat-Fier-Valona (area 50 km south of Tirana), 13 enemies were killed.
Pages 767_768 – 10.07.1943. The German troops located or about to enter the area of the [Italian] XI Army, if engaged in combat, will be under the high command of the XI Army, while the German troops located in Crete, Montenegro, Albania and the Aegean for the protection of coastal or other operations will be under the command of the responsible Italian troops. The Italian troops of the III Corps (Divisions Brennero, Forli and Pinerolo with support and rear troops) will be moved to Albania in August.
Page 768 – 10.07.1943. The commanding staff of the German army agrees with the command structure of the German troops in the coastal areas still held by the Italians in Croatia, Montenegro, Albania and Rhodes... The participation of a [German] Mountain Division in the operation "Delta" (clearance operation in Western Greece), but it is not in the German interest to insert that Mountain Division into southern Albania.
Page 786 – 14.07.1943. In order to achieve a central and effective military administration in the southeast area, it is proposed to establish a "southeast direction headquarters" in the rank of an army command with a command and administrative staff, with the full rights of a territorial military command for the southeast area. The headquarters of southern Greece, the Thessaloniki-Aegean area, Serbia, Croatia, Albania and Montenegro will be put under the command of this headquarters.
Page 822 – 23.07.1943. The high command for the southeast sends and agrees with a situational analysis, made by the command of the air forces southeast and presented to the supreme command of the air forces, regarding the possibility of an enemy attack against Albania. Albania, unlike Dalmatia and Greece, has a coast that is easily accessible and has many airfields, some of which are good. However, bringing German reserves from the rest of the Balkans to the border areas is difficult, especially in winter and spring.
Page 526 – 24.07.1943. (Due to developments in Italy this order [Hitler's transfer of troops to Greece] cannot be implemented. The 92nd Grenadier Battalion will be moved via Albania to northern Greece to operate on the Adriatic coast.)
Page 841 – 26.07.1943. New regulation for the command in the south-eastern area: German troops located on the Croatian coast, in Montenegro, Albania and the Aegean are placed under Italian command. The Italian III Corps moves to Albania as soon as the German troops that will replace it arrive.
Page 842 – 26.07.1943. The final answer from "Commando Supremo" [Italian] arrives on 26.07.1943 at 14:50. It accepts the placement of the XI Army under German command, the appointment there of a German chief of general staff, the relocation of the VII Corps to the north; the "Brennero" Division will also be moved to Albania... 3. The German troops in Albania, Montenegro and the Croatian area occupied by Italy are under the Italian command of the east, respectively of the Italian II Army.
Page 857 – 29.07.1943. Southeast: German troops now or to be located in Croatia, Montenegro and Albania will be placed under Italian command there.
Page 862 – 30.07.1943. South East: The German Army Command takes a position regarding the assessment of the situation over Albania (including Montenegro and Croatia) made by the air forces of the South East and sent on 23.07.1943 by the high command of the South East and comes to the conclusion that, based on the experience with the Italian troops, it is necessary to intervene with German troops to protect the coastal border, which will be limited to the defense of the ports. The commanding staff of the German army puts the necessary forces on standby for this purpose.
Page 876 – 01.08.1943. The occupation of airports in Albania has begun through ground forces sent there by planes, paratroopers and a battalion named "Brandenburg".
Page 890 – 03.08.1943. Southeast: 2. The general staff of the German army requests that for now only the preparations ordered on 01.07.1943 be undertaken for Albania and Montenegro.
Page 894 – 04.08.1943. In Albania, revolutionary actions continue with attacks on Italian garrisons. Albanian airports are occupied by German forces.
Page 908 – 06.08.1943. Italian-German talks in Tarvisio [Udine, Italy]: General Ambrosio wants to move the Italian III Corps as soon as possible from eastern Greece to Albania where reinforcements are needed.
Page 910 – 06.08.1943. The actions of gangs continue, especially in Albania and Croatia.
Page 926 – 10.08.1943. KSFA has informed the high command of the southeast that the Italian supreme command will move on 01.09.1943 the Italian III Corps with two Divisions from eastern Greece to Albania.
Page 952 – 15.08.1943. General Roatta announces that the Italian Korparmata III will be moved on 01.09.1943 from Thessaly to Albania and 3 Divisions will be returned from the Italian II Army.
Page 959 – 16.08.1943. In Greece, the purges continue on our side. In Albania there are signs of disbandment of the militia, actions of gangs in Tirana, sabotage of crops in Serbia.
Page 996 – 23.08.1943. In the talks in Tarvisio and Bologna [in Italy], an agreement was reached with the Italians to move the III Corps to Albania in September.
Page 1002 – 24.08.1943. Hitler has ordered the strengthening of the 92nd Grenadier Regiment, which will be deployed not in Crete but in Albania.
Page 1009 – 25.08.1943. On 09.08.1943, the high command of the southeast made the request that in the case of the fall of the reinforcements on the Dalmatian and Albanian coast, gendarmes from the military forts should be put into action.
Page 1018 – 27.08.1943. The high command of the southeast announces on 26.08.1943 that the command of the air forces in the southeast has requested to move an air force guard battalion stationed in Crete to ensure the protection of the Greek and Albanian airports and in its rock it requires an infantry battalion.
Page 1022 – 28.08.1943. The Chief of General Staff of Army Group F announces that the Italians have requested that 1-2 German Divisions be moved to the Skopje-Elbasan area, as a reserve for intervention in Albania and for securing the road to Tirana. The Southeast High Command welcomes the opportunity thus created to introduce [German] forces into Albania now. On 29.08.1943, Hitler's acceptance of this movement was announced.
…The high command of the South-East undertakes the task of contacting the Bulgarian General Staff and asking [to provoke thought] whether the Bulgarians would be ready in the event of an enemy landing and Operation "Achse" [army disarmament operation Italian that was expected to capitulate] to expand their zone of occupation to Montenegro and Albania. The area of the invasion will depend on the situation in Serbia and the deployment plans of the Bulgarian artillery troops.
Page 1035 – 30.08.1943. In a conversation between Hitler and an expert of the foreign ministry on the Albanian issue, the possibilities of reconciliation with Albania in the case of a German invasion following the "Achse" operation are weighed.
Page 1042 – 01.09.1943. For the march of the German troops in Albania, for which the 100th Division of the regional air forces is planned, the written acceptance of the Eastern Italian command has been requested, the oral acceptance has come.
Page 1051 – 03.09.1943. The Southeastern High Command agrees to the withdrawal of the 4st Panzer Division from the Peloponnese. But the weakening of the forces there for about XNUMX weeks should be taken into account. The Southeast Command draws attention to the fact that if this Division will be used as a reserve group of the army, then the invasion of Albania in the case of the "Achse" operation, for which that Division was foreseen, cannot be carried out.
Page 1055 – 04.09.1943. The high command of the southeast announces that the occupation of the airports in Albania with one battalion each has begun and will end in the middle of September.
Page 1058 – 05.09.1943. ...4.1. The Italian "Brennero" division of the III Italian Corps is moving to Albania.
Page 1063_1064 – 06.09.1943. The South-East High Command announces on 05.09.1943 that the Italian Supreme Command has not yet accepted the entry of the troops of the 100th Air Force Division [German] and that the Italian East High Command will allow the entry of the Division into the Dibra area or Korça, but not in Elbasan. KSFA agrees with the intention of the high command in the southeast to leave the Division in question, which is currently located in the Ohrid-Manastir area, there. In the meantime, check the roads, maintain contact with the troops that secure the Albanian airports. The Italians should be informed about this.
Page 1068 – 07.09.1943. [After Italy's armistice with the Allies signed on 03.09.1943, which became known on 08.09.1943]: ….3. Is it necessary to appeal to the entire Balkans (Croats, Serbs, Albanians, Greeks) against the Italians? In this way, the hostility towards the Germans can be reduced. But in such a case, the necessary promises must be given (the coast of the Adriatic Sea for Croatia, independence for Albania) and the necessary facts must be given for this.
Page 1069 – 07.09.1943. [Describes the measures taken by the German headquarters after Italy's armistice with the Allies]... 5. By giving up the Ionian Islands, a good opportunity to attack Greece and Albania is given up.
Page 1072 – 07.09.1943. The High Command of the Southeast is informed of the intentions of the Italian Supreme Command for the relocation of the Italian III Corps to Albania as well as the relocation of three Divisions from Croatia to Italian soil. Instead of a Division located in Croatia, the "Forli" Division of the Italian Koorparmate III will now be moved to the homeland, so that Albania is reinforced by only two Italian Divisions ("Brennero" and "Pinerelo").
Page 1082 – 08.09.1943. Having been given the banner "Achse", the [German] high command in the southeast announces verbally at 22:20 that the high command of the Italian army has accepted the surrender of heavy and fixed weapons, but has requested that the soldiers carry handguns, taking into account the Bolshevik danger that threatens Italy. The Southeast High Command has rejected this request. In Albania, the situation is still unclear, because the high Italian commander is not present and in this way hides his responsibility.
Page 1085 – 09.09.1943. The German Supreme Headquarters announces that it intends to recognize Albania as autonomous (under certain conditions together with Montenegro). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should send a special team to clarify the situation in the country. Until this is clarified, the Second Tank Army will have executive power in Albania and Montenegro.
Page 1089 – 10.09.1943. Fighting continues with the Italians in Rhodes. The movements of our troops in Albania and Montenegro took place according to plan. The population of Greece, Albania, Serbia and Croatia is still calm... An Anglo-American attack in the southern Balkans is no longer calculated, but the danger on the Adriatic front, in which Albania is the weakest point, is clear.
Page 1090 – 10.09.1943. The high command in the southeast has summarized and presented anew the requirements for the defense of the southeast area, based also on the report on the state of the enemy presented by the department of foreign armies in the west. Among other things, he requested the clarification of command responsibility in the northern part of the southeastern part, the rapid introduction of German forces for the defense of the coast of Croatia, Montenegro and Albania, the approach of the offensive divisions, the reinforcement of the offensive division in Rhodes to create a A complete division with two regiments and the complete equipment of the SS Division "Nordland" as well as the SS Brigade "Nederland", the increase in the number of security forces in the entire rear area, the transfer of coastal artillery to the Albanian-Dalmatian coast and the return of him in a coastal fort.
Page 1095 – 11.09.1943. Fighting continues in Rhodos, where warships with troops have arrived. The movements of our troops in Greece according to the plan. In Albania, the creation of a new government has begun. The 100th Rifle Division reached Valona and occupied parts of Durrës in cooperation with other forces under its command.
Page 1098 – 12.09.1943. Italian forces of 40,000 capitulate in Rhodes. In Crete, pro-German Italian forces join German troops. To the north-west of Athens and on [the island of] Euboea there are bandit movements. In Albania, the occupation of the coastal area progresses.
Page 1100 – 13.09.1943. [Describes orders regarding Italian officers and soldiers who are willing to fight alongside the Germans]. There are several possibilities to use these troops: 1) As militia or police in Italy, after being trained by the SS forces or outside Italy in fighting against gangs. 2) As construction battalions in the German army. 3) As auxiliary troops in the composition of the German troops. The introduction of these troops into areas with populations of German origin as well as into Croatia and Albania is excluded.
Page 1102 -13.09.1943. The issue of an Albanian-Montenegro state is open, since those Albanian districts with which connections have been established, since they are not sure how the war will end, do not accept autonomy thanks to the mercy of Germany.
Page 1114 – 17.09.1943. The Albanian-Dalmatian-Montenegro coast is gaining more and more importance, because there exist suitable conditions for the adversary, just as on the Channel [La Manche] coast, from where an attack can be launched into the heart of Europe.
Page 1116 – 17.09.1943. The situation in Greece and Albania is satisfactory... After the first attempts to create a government in Albania have failed, (compare 13.9./6) efforts are being made in Kosovo where locals have been found ready to create a national government. If this is to succeed, then an administration must be set up which appears from the outside to be independent.
Page 1127 – 21.09.1943. KSFA recalls that according to the order dated 15.09.1943, only loyal Italian troops can be used for construction works, but only in Greece and not in Croatia, Montenegro and Albania, where local residents must be taken for these works.
Page 1134_1135 – 23.09.1943. The "Brennero" division operating in Albania has expressed its readiness to continue fighting on the German side. The high command of the south-east has ordered it to be sent to the Rashka-Mitrovica area so that the troops can be checked and the part that will be judged reliable will join the 999th infantry battalions. The German command staff does not want less reliable troops to be merged into the 999th battalions and proposes that those troops be used in providing rail transport. The troops thus relieved from there will join the other battalions.
The Bulgarian General Staff has presented a report on the situation of the Bulgarian minority on the eastern Albanian border. This report was judged by the South-Eastern Command to be excessive. Therefore, he submitted that the Bulgarian request for the occupation of this area should be rejected and Albanian militia troops should be used there. This opinion was accepted on 20.09.1943 by the German leadership staff. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on 21.09.1943 that the Bulgarian envoy requested that the border areas of Albania populated by Bulgarians be occupied by the Bulgarians in order to protect the Bulgarian minorities from the Albanians.
The KSFA informs the German military attaché in Sofia [Bulgaria] that the Southeastern high command assesses the situation on the border much more positively than the Bulgarian general staff. Therefore, local militia forces will operate there to maintain security. Conquering that area is not necessary for now.
Page 1139 – 24.09.1943. The army's central headquarters has set the following points for the talks with the south-eastern command to be held on 24.09.1943 at Hitler's headquarters. I. The development of the war: ... The sequence of counterattacks and the troops to be used, the occupation of the islands in the Aegean and the Adriatic ... securing the rear in Albania and Montenegro ....
Page 1143 – 25.09.1943. The situation in the Balkans: In Euboea, Albania, Serbia and Montenegro, the actions of gangs continue and a clean-up operation has begun on our side.
Page 1144 – 26.09.1943. The Southeast Command announces the securing of the Tetovo-Gostivar-Dibër-Strugë-Kërcovo area (Eastern Albania), an area which the Bulgarians wanted to conquer.
Page 1147 – 27.09.1943. Insurrectionary actions continue in Albania.
Page 1151 – 28.09.1943. In an addendum to the notification to the German military attaché in Sofia on 23.09.1943, it is stated that the area of north-eastern Albania up to the valley of Vardar will be occupied later by German troops.
Page 1154 – 30.09.1943. In Albania, the actions of the gangs intensify further; more and more British agents have been spotted.
Page 1164 – 01.10.1943. [This refers to the instructions of the German high command for the distribution of troops in the southeast]. …. X Mountain Division to be sent to Epirus or the Albanian coast. …. The purges continue in Albania and Croatia.
Page 1168 – 03.10.1943. Hitler orders to appoint a "General responsible for Albania". KSFA issues an ordinance for this.
Page 1171 – 04.10.1943. Hitler orders the Southern High Command and Army Group B as follows: The enemy is expected to direct the main operations against the southeastern region either from southern Italy to Albania - Montenegro - southern Croatia or after fighting from central Italy against northern Croatia – Istria.
Page 1178 – 06.10.1943. A British attack is expected in the southeastern region against the Albanian-Dalmatian coast or across the Aegean Sea against Macedonia and Thrace.
Page 1181 – 07.10.1943. The action of gangs in Albania and Croatia is strengthened.
Page 1184 – 08.10.1943. In Albania, an Albanian government has been established with German help, which intends to create its own militia. The announcements of the army headquarters for the dates 09.10.1943 and 13.10.1943 on the release by the army of the Albanians who are in the SS Mountain Division of Bosnia have been rejected by the commander-in-chief of the SS [Heinrich Himmler].
Page 1191 – 10.10.1943. KSFA agrees with the idea put forward on 01.10.1943 by the South-East High Command for the relocation of reinforcement construction forces in the area of the II Tank Army (Albanian-Dalmatian coast).
Page 1193 – 11.10.1943. The situation in the Balkans: Our purges in Greece continue. In Albania, fighting of the 100th and 118th Shooting Divisions with the remaining parts of the Italian "Firenze" and "Venecia" Divisions.
Page 1197 – 13.10.1943. The [Italian] government of General Pietro Badoglio declares war on Germany. The King of Italy renounces the title "Emperor of Ethiopia" and "King of Albania".
Page 1208_1209 – 18.10.1943. Hitler informed the Bulgarian regent's council on 18.10.1943 that General MR von Weichs would come to visit them, on the reinforcement of the coast of Thrace near Kavala with a Bulgarian Division, as well as on the measures to be taken for the protection of the Bulgarian minorities in eastern Albania.
Page 1212 – 21.10.1943. The KSFA defines the rights of the all-powerful German general in Albania as well as the command that will be established in Montenegro.
Page 1221 – 25.10.1943. The Albanian government has no support. No connection has yet been reached with the gang leaders of the Greek national movement and with Mihailovic [Dragoljub "Draža" Mihailovic, the pro-royalist Serbian Chetnik commander].
Page 1252 – 05.11.1943. In Albania there are two groups of thugs: the communists who are connected to Tito and the nationals who do not want to be tainted by the connection with the Germans.
Page 1254 – 05.11.1943. An Albanian national government was created and sworn in... On 04.11.1943, the central headquarters of the army submitted the following points for the meeting held on 05.11.1943 with the Bulgarian delegation at Hitler's headquarters: 1) The use of another Bulgarian Division between the Bulgarian Divisions VII and XVI. 2) Security in the Bulgaria-Albania border region.
...Since Hitler has promised the Bulgarian Prime Minister the military protection of the border areas of Albania, the high command of the southeast must keep this promise. (This is a region with a Bulgarian minority, an area which the local Bulgarian forces were willing to occupy but were prevented by their government. The German troops declared themselves neutral. When the communists later attacked the Bulgarian minorities, the Bulgarians demanded the occupation of this area from the Germans. It is not known why the Bulgarians did not occupy that region. For this task, the tank division was moved to the east. After this and the repeated request for help, Hitler ordered the invasion of eastern Albania with German troops).
The high command of the southeast receives on the same day the order for the clearing of the Tetovo-Dibër-Strugë-Kërcovo-Gostivar area and the creation of local self-defense troops with the help of the SS and the police forces of Greece and with weapons taken from the Italian forces . On 06.11.1943, the high command of the southeast announces the measures it intends to take. Hitler agrees with them on 07.11.1943. The Commander of the Operations Staff in the KSFA [General Alfred JF Jodl] decides that the German battalions will wait until the militia has been raised, which should consist of Bulgarian Macedonians. The South East High Command receives the necessary instructions.
Page 1268 – 10.11.1943. The high command of the southeast considers the war against Tito as the main task, even more important than the protection of the coastal border. Since the forces needed for this have been significantly weakened due to the shift of troops to the east, it is reported that Hitler has accepted the use of the 1943st Mountain Division for the "Kugelblitz" operation [against the Yugoslav communist partisans in December XNUMX]. After this operation, this Division should be positioned in such a way that it can be used as a reserve force in Albania and in north-western Greece.
Page 1275 – 12.11.1943. The German all-powerful in Albania is General Theodor Geib, but the executive power is in the hands of the high command of the II Tank Army (General Lothar Rendulic).
Page 1278 – 13.11.1943. Note in the file on the economic-military importance of Albania and the extraction of chromium there.
Page 1289 – 17.11.1943. In Albania, there are difficulties because the soldiers cannot be paid in the local currency, because the Albanian government does not agree to give the necessary amount for this and we do not want to exert stronger pressure. Delegate Hermann Neubacher is trying to find a solution to the problem.
Page 1290 – 18.11.1943. Completion of the purges of the 100th Rifle Division in Albania and fighting in Peljeshac [on the Croatian coast].
Page 1292 – 19.11.1943. ...Successful purges in Albania and in the north of Montenegro.
Page 1317 – 28.11.1943. Situation in the Balkans: Enemy bombing of road traffic and material deposits in the area of southern Croatia, Montenegro and Albania.
Page 1330 – 02.12.1943. ...Quiet position of the gangs in Albania and Montenegro... Due to the difficulties in financing the army in Albania, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was requested on 03.12.1943 to appoint a deputy for the envoy Hermann Neubacher. This is also reported to the high command of the southeast, which also receives the relevant instructions. Since the enemy combat action is increasing in the Albanian-Croatian region, the high command of the southeast announces the danger created for all the troops participating in the "Kugelblitz" operation.
Page 1335 – 04.12.1943. The military intelligence office receives the relevant instructions regarding the position it should take towards the Foreign Ministry regarding the Bulgarian-Albanian border disputes on Lake Ohrid.
Page 1373 – 20.12.1943. The efforts of the Regency Council fail to attract national forces to Albania.
Page 1461 – [Chapter: Notes of documents in the War Diary] 04.10.1943. Battle plan for Southern High Command and Army Group B: ...A) I expect the enemy to direct his main attacks against the Southeast region starting from Italy, possibly with some forces from Africa. It cannot be predicted whether the adversary will attack Albania/Montenegro/Croatia from southern Italy which is occupied by him, or whether he will try to push northward the German forces in Italy... Signed Adolf Hitler.
Page 1474 – [Chapter: Notes of documents in the War Diary] 10.12.1943. ...The Italian divisions of Arezzo, Taurinese, Ferrara, Emilia, Venice and Parma in Montenegro and Albania have been put under the command of bandits; a part of the Florence Division [41st Infantry Division] fights under the command of their Division Commander on the side of the bandits [in Albania]. A total of about 11000 people. Approximately 2200 Italians were captured by the German army.
Page 1540 – German army leadership in the climactic year of the war. Overview of the War Diary of the German command staff in 1943: ...After the Albanian airfields had been occupied by our forces even before the capitulation of Italy, preparations were made in September 1943 for the establishment of an independent Albanian state. The establishment of an Albanian-Montenegro state was not well received since they did not want to be dependent on Germany, which had practically lost the war. Finally, at the beginning of October, with the help of Germany, an Albanian government was created, which took over the formation of nearly 30.000 volunteer forces.
Pages 1545 – 1546 – [Chapter: Overview of the War Diary of the German Command Staff in 1943. In the section on Bulgaria it is written]: …The new Bulgarian government (after the death of Tsar Boris) apparently wanted military support to was rewarded with the acquisition of lands in the east of Albania, where a scattered Bulgarian minority lived. Thus on 05.11.1943, when discussing the Bulgarian occupation policy in the Balkans, [Bulgarian Foreign Minister] Schischmanoff pointed out the good treatment of the Greek minority by the Bulgarians in Thrace. To this appearance of the Bulgarian minister Schischmanoff, Hitler responds with the remark that this is a clever policy of the Bulgarians.
Regarding the exchange of views on Albania, [Bulgarian Prime Minister present at the meeting] Bojiloff very carefully asked to think about the possibility of moving Bulgarian troops to the endangered border area with Albania. [He said] Bulgaria has only a few and poorly equipped troops, but she will try to get the necessary troops ready for this purpose. On the other hand, he believes that with direct talks with the Albanian government, a solution to the aforementioned problems can be reached. Hitler takes a negative attitude to these demands and thinks that the best thing would be for the SS troops to raise a permanent force composed of Bulgarians. In this way, Bulgarian troops would be present in this region.
An idea of the Bulgarian Prime Minister Bojiloff that he wanted territorial revisions on the Albanian border, Hitler did not answer directly and explained that such a thing would complicate the situation in Albania without any benefit... In the Bulgarian-Albanian border area, SS troops will set up a formation made up of Bulgarians from Macedonia, but the newly established Albanian government at the beginning of November 1943 cannot be tainted by the donation of territories [to the Bulgarians].
Page 1614 – [Under the section on the Balkans as a region of military operations, it is written]: …. In Albania, the airports were occupied in time, and apart from that, the partisan groups neutralized each other, while a government created under the influence of the German army accepted the recruitment of Albanian volunteers for the "Skanderbeg" SS Division. …. FOOTNOTE: Georg Kastriota, general Iskender-bey (Skanderbeg) was an Albanian nobleman (1405-1468), defender of Christianity and the freedom of Albanians against the Turks.
Volume IV
January 1, 1944 – May 22, 1945
The role of Army Groups and their Commands
Page 35. As great as the role of other commands and Armies is, the role of the Southeastern Army and Command (Army Group E with Commander-in-Chief Colonel-General Alexander Löhr) was exceptional. The reader of this book will notice how Hitler did not take into account the advice of the "experts" who were educated soldiers but whom he viewed with suspicion and contempt. Only with great delay did he allow the withdrawal of troops from Crete and other Aegean islands, where there were still 60,000 soldiers. Surprisingly, the withdrawal of troops from the Peloponnese where there was only one railway and one bridge connecting with the rest of Greece was also carried out. The withdrawal of the troops from Greece was also carried out, although there were two partisan forces operating there that fortunately fought against each other.
Catastrophe was on the horizon when the troops were retreating across the Balkan mountains, because under the Soviet impetus the Bulgarian forces who had until then been fighting on our side attacked us from the unprotected eastern flank. But that attack was not only faced but the positions were held until the last soldier left Albania. Further retreat was impeded by mountains as high as 1400 feet, and the frost of winter setting in, two factors whose horrors can hardly be overestimated; however, it was even more endangered because Tito's troops, until then held in check by German troops, could now operate freely. Therefore, Tito's army was able to join forces with the Red Army troops that were coming from Romania and occupied Belgrade.
Despite all those difficulties, General Alexander Löhr's Army Group E managed to maintain until April 1945 a closed front that stretched across Croatia and Bosnia, with a length of 1500 km. General Alexander Löhr managed to do what Napoleon Bonaparte failed to do during the retreat from Russia: he withdrew his troops and managed to build a new front which was not broken from the front but from the rear.
Italian Theater of War (01.04.1944 – 31.12.1944)
II. The fighting from the capture of Rome on 4 June 1944 to the capture of Florence (10 August 1944) and the enemy landing in southern France on 15 August 1944
4. Protection of the operational area of the Adriatic coast including Istria
Page 540. Increased band action in northern Greece, Albania, and Montenegro may serve to block German forces and prepare the landing of Polish or other Slavic troops.
Page 541. Therefore the south-eastern command must be prepared to face a landing in southern Albania or north-western Greece. ….. For the protection of the endangered coasts, Hitler has ordered the reinforcement and expansion of the defense of the sea coasts, the reinforcement of the coastal artillery with a heavy focus on the Adriatic coast, putting into action the artillery forces that have been in the Crimea and that are now ready to fight against gangs in southern Albania and northern Greece.
Military developments in the Southeast (01.01.1944 – 31.03.1944)
Southeast space as part of the overall theater of war
Looking back at 1943
Page 603. The third front in the south-eastern zone, the Albanian-Montenegro-Dalmatian coast, presented no great danger at the time when the Italian lands on the far coast were all in the hands of the Axis powers. However, the very small density of the road network, the almost complete absence of railways, the state of waterworks, etc., will make it difficult for the enemy forces to advance and give our commands time to take the necessary measures.
Page 604. After Mussolini's government fell in Italy on 25.07.1943, the "Achse" plan (previously called "Alarich" for Italy and "Constantine" for the Balkans) was implemented on that occasion: the intervention in Italy and the south-eastern area, disarming the Italians and taking over the defense of the areas previously held by the Italians in Croatia, Montenegro, Albania and Greece.
Page 605. A part of the Italian troops jumped to the side of the insurgents, especially after the news was given that Italy was no longer fighting on the side of Germany, and that they controlled a large part of the Dalmatian-Montenegro-Albanian coast.
Pages 606-607. Hitler emphasized in the last days of December 1943 that he anticipated an enemy attack in the Balkan area, especially on the Dalmatian-Montenegro-Albanian coast.
Distribution of forces in early 1944
Page 611. There were two German military units in Albania: near the coast to the west of Berat, there was the 100th Rifle Division and in the area of Crna [Montenegro - mark. ed.] 297th Infantry Division, both under the command of the XXI Corps.
Analysis and measures against an Allied landing at Nettuno, Italy (22.01.1944)
Page 613. …Allied landing operations are possible first on the west coast of the Balkans from Arta to the south of Split and second through the Aegean Sea towards Salonika. In that case, Turkey would abandon its neutrality or even if the "Gertrude" operation [of the invasion of Turkey by the German army - St. ed.] the allies would land on the western coast of the Balkans.
Reorganization of SS units
Pages 623-624. On 02.03.1944, it was announced to the south-eastern high command that it was given tactical command over the 18th SS Motorized Infantry Division "Horst Wessel", including the troops of the general command of the XVII Corps. Until further notice, this Division was only allowed to be used for security duties within the region where it was located. The same was true for the "Skanderbeg" SS Division, which, as the high command in the southeast was informed on 12.03.1944, would be created from Albanian troops located in the 13th Bosnian SS Division and Albanian militia troops.
Serbia and Mihalović in the winter of 1943-1944
Page 639. Even in Albania there were at first suitable conditions for the unification of anti-communist forces and the establishment of militia units in accordance with the plan by Hermann Neubacher. The driving force in that direction was the pro-German Minister Xheva. In cooperation with him, in January 1944, the establishment of a state enforcement apparatus began. It was initially about supporting the four infantry battalions which were already in action and the occupying forces would assist them by providing them with weapons, equipment, training and supervisory personnel.
In addition, the union of all the units that were under the leadership of tribal chiefs or leaders in a national army would be prepared. Leadership was in the hands of a senior SS and police commander in Albania, SS Major General and Brigade Commander Josef Fitzthum, who was apparently an adviser to the Albanian Secretary of State for national security. The operational command of the Albanian military units mentioned above in all matters of military action, location and time of action of the troops was in the hands of the general command of the XXI Corps in Tirana.
Then there was also the post of the all-powerful German general, first General Theodore Geib and then General Otto Gullmann, who initially had the task of exerting their influence on the Albanian authorities (for which the German Foreign Ministry demands as much independence as possible ) according to the instructions of the South Eastern High Command. The staff of the all-powerful German general was reduced in the period of late 1943 - early 1944; for some time, the idea of a merger with the general command of the XXI Corps was considered, but it was not pursued further. The co-existence of these different commands, to which the plenipotentiary of the German Foreign Ministry [Hermann Neubacher] was added, created great difficulties, just like in Croatia.
All those measures were made difficult, just like in Montenegro, by the difficult economic situation and poor food supply. The preventive measures of the German authorities, first of all the envoy Hermann Neubacher against price gouging and inflation, were only partially successful. In March - April 1944, both countries were threatened by famine. Envoy Hermann Neubacher tried to help through the German army and, among other things, requested the dispatch of 120 trucks. Since they could only be sent piecemeal, the German High Command allowed Southeastern Command to assist with its own means; the idea was that the southeastern command in the areas where the civilian population could not be supplied through the local administration would take over not only the supply but also the responsibility for those areas, understandably in close cooperation with the envoy Hermann Neubacher.
Fighting in the winter and spring months
Page 647. On 13.02.1944, the command in the southeast received the order that the 100th Rifle Division, which served for the defense of the coast of Albania, should leave there quickly to protect the railway in the Bitola-Skopje region.
Page 649. (This is mainly about Tito's war in Serbia against the Germans which was carried out with the help of Russian advisers and English supplies and which struck the German army at a very inopportune time as the right troops to withstand that offensive were located in Hungary. Making the balance of the forces on both sides and the regrouping of the German forces to face that offensive, it is also written: - note transl.) ... In the last days of March 1944, other Bulgarian battalions had to be moved and two companies of the 297th Infantry Division from eastern Albania.
Page 654. When it was still not clear how the Anglo-Americans would conduct the fighting after they had occupied Italy, the German command was widely concerned with the possibility of an enemy landing on the western side of the Balkan peninsula starting from Italy. Therefore, she tried to control the ports and islands of the Dalmatian-Montenegro-Albanian-Greek coast as soon as possible. Which they achieved in most cases in the autumn months of 1943. ….. In the above coastal area that could be threatened by an Allied landing, it was thought that bandit troops of a number of about 20 people were operating.
"White" and "Red" in Greece
Pages 669-670. While the attention of the German army in the summer of 1944 was focused on Croatia, the military forces in Greece were few in number with the main task of coastal defense and clearing operations in the surroundings. …. Greek resistance movements never turned into large-scale operations, as happened with Tito and his three offensives in Serbia. They were very closely related to the region where they had power and influence. While ELAS [communist forces – sh. ed.] had influence in most of the Peloponnese, in Boetia, Thessaly-Thrace (their headquarters was in Verna south of Edessa) and in the depths of Epirus; EDES [non-communist forces – mark. ed.] was limited to the north of the Gulf of Arta to Parga. With the leader of the EDES forces Colonel Zerva, and according to the plan of the special envoy Hermann Neubacher, the XXII Mountain Corps in the fall of 1943 made a general ceasefire agreement which was respected until July 1944. On the other hand, the agreements with the ELAS forces agreements they were only special and according to the country.
Since the relationship between the Greek resistance groups was constantly changing (ELAS and EDES went through short-term and isolated agreements), the German leadership had more opportunities to intervene to take one side out of the game and prevent a joint operation between them.
The fight against the insurgents in the southeastern direction at the time of the general offensive of the Allies and the withdrawal of German troops
Page 670. The high south-eastern command announced on 21.06.1944 that it did not expect any frontal attack in the Peloponnese nor in the region of the Crete-Rhodes islands. However, small local attacks in the area of northwest Greece and in Albania had to be calculated.
Pages 671-672. On 05.06.1944, the 100st Mountain Division started the "Gemsbock" (Wild Goat) operation in the Albania-Greece border area, starting from Macedonia. After setting up a blocking line on the border, starting from the lakes, it was necessary to advance in a southwesterly direction towards the coast. In this area, after the departure of the 17.05.1944th Rifle Division, as the South-Eastern high command points out on XNUMX, the bandit activity supported by the British has greatly increased and has reached a high level of danger. The southeastern command further announces that with the exception of a narrow area on the coast and some support points along the Korçë-Janinë road, there is a vanguard of an enemy landing force in that area, which had to be taken very seriously also due to its proximity to Bari. Brindisi and Tarentin that created the possibility of a sudden landing and that Corfu was seriously threatened by enemy attacks.
The South-Eastern Command had provided the 4th SS Motorized Infantry Division of the border police for that sweep operation, but the German Army's commanding staff did not agree with that decision, since that Division as the only motorized unit should not be involved in the war with the gangs. but moreover to be kept ready where it was (in Thessaly) as a motorized reserve "with its eyes on the coast".
The advance of the 25.05.1944st Mountain Division met strong resistance from the well-armed insurgent forces. As well as in the "Rösselsprung" operation [on 06.06.1944 - 12.06.1944 for the capture of Tito in Drvar, Croatia - mark. ed.] Anglo-American forces were bombing from Italian airfields, thus seriously interfering in the fighting. On 25.06.1944 the XNUMXst Mountain Division reached the coast and turned south towards the security line previously erected on the border. As a result of the operation, the south-eastern high command announced on XNUMX, the enemy had suffered great losses and in the area of southern Albania freedom of operational movements was guaranteed for now.
Pages 672-673. In the area of northern Albania, fierce fighting took place in the second half of July 1944 between the Skanderbeg Division (created by the Albanian forces originally part of the 13th SS Mountain Division "Hanxhar"), which was located there since May 1944, and the communist forces for which are not discussed in detail here. This Division had hard fighting here (see the Situation Book on 24.07, 25.07, 28.07.1944). In the armaments and way of fighting of the communist troops, progress was noted in the unification of the separate communist groups and their close connection with Tito. Towards the end of the month, this Division met on the Albanian-Montenegro border with a new attack by the communists trying to enter southern Serbia (see the Situation Book 28.07.1944). The Division then received the order (operation "Draufgänger") to create a preparatory zone for a later major offensive, starting from the region west of Peja and attacking in the direction of Beran.
In the fighting against Tito's organized forces, the center of gravity, despite the heavy losses suffered by Tito's movement in April and the first half of May 1944, was again in the border area of Serbia and Montenegro as well as in Montenegro itself . The South-East High Command pointed out on 17.05.1944 that Montenegro, instead of being an isolating part between Croatia and Albania, was in danger of turning into a powerful area of red power. The Second Communist Corps had managed to maintain its striking power here, thus becoming a rallying point for bandit troops that had been beaten and weakened in other regions. Apparently, the red leadership intends to refresh the troops in Montenegro and start a new offensive in the direction of Serbia. In the last days of May 1944, while the "Rösselsprung" operation was taking place in Bosnia, powerful communist forces tried to enter Serbia from the southeastern part of the Serbian-Montenegro border (Situation Book 30.05.1944). At the beginning of June, troops were massed in the northeast of Montenegro under the command of General Leeb [Helge Auleb? - St. ed.] to occupy airports and places where gangs could enter (Situation Book 06.06.1944). At the end of June, the plan was drawn up to undertake another clearing operation, in which the Albanian SS Skanderbeg Division would participate together with the SS mountain and police forces (Situation Book 20.06.1944). The operation ended on 30.06.1944 without succeeding in destroying the assembled enemy forces that were trying to enter southern Serbia (Situation Book 01.07.1944).
Page 674. The Greek nationalist general Zervas, who had made an agreement on neutrality with the Germans, attacked the German forces suddenly on 05.07.1944 on the Preveza-Agrinio line. It is thought that he may have done it under the instigation of the English, but it is possible that he did it simply for his own interest. …… In a summary of the assessment of the situation on 12.07.1944, the south-eastern command points out that there is a possibility of a connection between the revival of Zerva's forces and the intentions of the landing of the Anglo-Americans in western Greece or in southern Albania and called it in this matter destroying Zerva's troops as a very important task.
Another important danger, as the south-eastern command emphasized, was the preparations for a communist offensive towards southern Serbia or in the area of Kosovo with a heavy center in the Berani-Bjelopolje region, which was proven by the measures taken by the communists in the area of Serbia southeast.
Page 675. The Supreme Headquarters of the German Army, which on 15.07.1944 assessed the situation presented by the South-Eastern Command, had long been counting on an Allied attack launched from Italy against northern Greece and southern Albania, an attack which could also be combined with a operation on the island of Rhodos (Communication of General von Buttlar 29.06.1944). That is why the supreme headquarters called the departure of the 1st Mountain Division to Montenegro undesirable; this Division was of great importance in facing the offensive of the allies in northern Greece and southern Albania; but before that he had to destroy the gangs of Zerva, which was a precondition for the landing of the allied forces. But for now, no decision has been made, since these issues will be discussed during an upcoming visit by the Chief of the South-Eastern Staff, Major-General August Winter - a meeting which took place on 20.07.1944.
Pages 675-676. The Southeastern High Command repeated the request [on 17.07.1944] to send the 4st Mountain Division to Montenegro, emphasizing its psychological impact in a battle for Sofia. For western Greece, she requested the release from reserve in Thessaly of the XNUMXth SS Motorized Police Division, which together with other units of Army Group E could be used against both communist and Zerva forces, or at least be used in the event of a the landing of the aletes in the region of Ioannina.
Page 677. …. c) EDES and ELAS in northwestern Greece: The use of the 4th SS Motorized Police Division on the western coast of Greece began on 27.07.1944 (Situation Book 28.07.1944). Meanwhile, a new situation was created, as presented in a notification of the South-Eastern high command. Zerva's forces stopped the attacks, so it seems possible to resume talks with them. The south-eastern high command wants to follow this attitude which is related to the situation in Greece, especially in Athens where the nationalist circles are ready to make an agreement with the [German] occupying power and it is not considered impossible for Zerva to accept the German demands (the departure from the coast and the port of Parga, the fight against communist forces, etc.). On the other hand, the situation has worsened in southern Epirus due to the action of the 7 Communist Brigades. The aim of this group was probably the conquest of the Preveza-Mesolongji coastal strip. Therefore, the South-Eastern high command designed, in agreement with Army Group E, the "Kreuzotter" operation by which the 4th SS Division of the Motorized Police and units of the 104th Infantry Division attack in the southern direction from Ioannina above Artë; at the same time the ELAS forces in Boeotia and south of Pindi are attacked. The impression that the German successes in these battles will leave will probably influence Zerva to accept the German demands; otherwise, after the end of the "Kreuzotter" operation, the freed forces will attack the region held by him.
Pages 680-681. …. d) Impacts of the turn (August-September 1944): ….. When the commander of the South-Eastern High Command, the envoy Herman Neubacher, the Foreign Minister [Joachim von Ribbentrop], the SS Commander-in-Chief [Heinrich Himmler], etc. gathered on 22.08.1944 at Hitler's headquarters, a new instruction for the development of operations in the south-eastern direction was prepared (22.08.1944). It was not signed, because the next day a completely new situation happened in Romania [Soviet forces break the front in Romania, Romania went over to the Soviet side – St. ed.]. Thus, the fluctuations of Turkey and the change of attitude in Bulgaria [Bulgaria was declared neutral on 26.08.1944 and demanded the departure of German troops - note. ed.] brought change to the southeastern region. The previous German position in this region could no longer be maintained: on 26.08.1944 the South-Eastern High Command received the order to prepare for the withdrawal of all troops and equipment south of the line Corfu-Ioannina-Kalabaka-Olympus, thus abandoning the Aegean Sea and Greece started.
Page 681. …. e) Tito's third case in Serbia (July-August 1944): .....Operation "Draufgänger" of SS Mountain Division Skanderbeg on the Montenegrin-Albanian border (Berane) drew numerous enemy troops into combat, but could not stop the offensive of the Communist Corps I and II in the direction of Serbia.
Page 682. The muster of the 03.08.1944st Mountain Division was delayed because its transport was not planned. On 04.08.1944, the railway near Mitrovica was cut off while the arriving parts of the Division were forced to engage in fighting around the region of Peja. (Book of Situation XNUMX)
Page 685. Repeated cases of desertion and disbandment were noted in the SS Mountain Division Skanderbeg at the beginning of September, so its disbandment was ordered.
Page 686. An offensive [by the Allies] against the Rhodos-Karpathos islands, the Peloponnese, the coasts of northern Greece and southern Albania is considered possible, especially considering the preparations in the Egyptian-Syrian-Palestinian area.
Page 690. (Here it is written about the withdrawal of German troops from the Balkans, which began in October 1944 - note trans.) .... A little slower was the withdrawal from the coastal areas of Montenegro and Albania, which was closely related to the withdrawal of Army Group E (Durrës 12.01.1945, Cetinje 17.01.1945, Kotorr 21.01.1945, etc.).
Page 699. Until the first week of October 1944, the aim of the German command was that with Army Group E (which received on 03.10.1944 the order to withdraw from Greece, southern Albania and southern Macedonia) located in „ The blue line "Shkodër-Skopje-Kelcyre [in northern Greece - st. ed.] and with the Serbian Army Group located on the Negotin-Danube line (since 01.10.1944) and the Vlasotince-Bela Palanka-Zajeçar-D. Milanovac (since 05.10.1944), to hold the Croatian-Montenegro-Northern Albanian and Serbian area. But very soon it was seen that most of Serbia was lost. On 10.10.1944, the order was given for the withdrawal across the [river of] Morava.
Page 701. In the first week of November it became completely clear what the goals of the Soviet leadership were: the Soviet armies had begun the offensive in Hungary, and the task of the Bulgarians and Tito's units was to destroy the German positions in the Croatian-Montenegro-Albanian area north and in that way the western part of the Balkan peninsula more or less above the line Shkodër-Veleš [in Macedonia - mark. ed.], in accordance with the division of zones in Moscow.
Page 704. The Albanian communist movement, which probably did not start with a local initiative, during the summer [1944] became a stable part of Tito's organization as "Central Headquarters for Albania". The impression is created that for some time there was also a plan to introduce Albania into the Yugoslav federation (Situation Book 25.07.1944).
Page 706. In anticipation of a general and quite threatening offensive by the Allies, the increase in the actions of insurgents in the regions of southeastern Europe still under German occupation and the failure to establish governments in Montenegro and Albania renewed the question: whether at least the voluntary organizations Serbs and the political movements behind them by getting more help in armaments and supplies could they become an auxiliary and fighting force for the German army and to create a security zone for all.
Page 707. The special envoy for the south-eastern zone Hermann Neubacher happened in April 1944 for some time at the central leadership headquarters to discuss matters of the time. Among other things: ….. d) The provision of 120 trucks which, as mentioned earlier, were previously requested to avoid the problems of supplying the population in Albania and Montenegro where famine threatened. This was important because the increase in gang activity was also related to the lack of food. With those measures, the special envoy hoped to organize the Albanian national forces in order to reach a number of about 20 people. For that, he needed machine guns for 000-10 people and the introduction of small German units with grenade launchers into the Albanian national forces. In addition, the special envoy Hermann Neubacher had to discuss in the central headquarters of the German leadership the issue of financing the German army in Greece and Albania, since the complete bankruptcy of the local currencies seemed inevitable.
Page 708. …. At the same time, January 1944, the newly established government bodies in Albania were dissolved. The reliable members of the shooting battalions that were dispersed were regrouped in the Albanian SS Division "Skanderbeg".
Page 720. The South Eastern Command, noting the threat to the railway in Macedonia, the dire state of transport and the lack of coal due to sabotage, repeatedly requested a decision regarding Greece until on 03.10.1944 it received the order to withdrew from Greece, southern Albania and southern Macedonia. …… On 16.10.1944 they withdrew from [Greek cities] Thebes and Itea, simultaneously the withdrawal from the island of Lemnos also began. On 21.10.1944, the German rear line was located on the line Laria-Qafa e Metsovoni; on 23.10.1944, a blocking line was created on both sides of Korça. Two days ago they pulled out of Volos, the last important port south of Thessaloniki. On 25.10.1944, the front crossed the lakes of southern Albania.
Page 721. In Albania, the Durrës-Elbasan line continued to be maintained. In the night from November 1 to 2, 1944, the rear of Army Group crosses the Greek-Macedonian border without any significant enemy pressure. The exit from Greece was completed.
Page 723. With the fall of the city of Njish, Group-Armata lost its railway connection. But the Russian offensive in southern Serbia and the Bulgarian offensive in the south and southwest of Njis was also threatening the last important route of the march from Skopje through Mitrovica, Kraljevo, Uzice to reach Sarajevo. Passing through the highlands of eastern Albania and east of Montenegro would be the end of a united retreat for Army Group E.
Page 724. … At the same time the Bulgarians launched a large-scale offensive against Skopje and thus the risk of fragmentation for Army-Group E increased. ….. The 11th Airborne Division withdrew to the north and east of Pristina and created an arcing front. ….. The battles on 02.11.1944 and the advance of three Bulgarian Divisions and a tank brigade north of Podujeva caused the rupture of the front in the Mërdara Pass and the threat of the road junction in Pristina. …. A planned withdrawal from Macedonia was drawn up. On 06.11.1944 Strumica was liberated; on 07.11.1944 the rear guard of the XX Corps was in Shtip. On 11.11.1944 Veles was abandoned and on the night of 13/14.11.1944 Skopje was liberated. In Pristina, fierce battles are taking place with the Bulgarians.
Page 725. In the withdrawal of Army Group E, the withdrawal of the XXI Corps (181st, 297th Infantry Divisions, Fortress Brigades, etc.) from Albania occupies a special place. The retreat was originally planned to pass through Nikšić [in Montenegro] and Trebinja [in southern Bosnia] to reach Mostar, which became impossible after the enemy captured the Adriatic outlet of the Narenta River. So the troops were cut off from their retreat and would have to try to break through a highland in the northeast direction held by Tito's forces.
After leaving Tirana on 17.11.1944, a military unit was assembled in Podgorica to attack Nikšić, an attack which failed. On 22.11.1944 the commander-in-chief of the south-east troops went to Albania by plane himself to assess the possibility of a crack in the front for this military unit. It was decided that the unit would return from Podgorica to Prijepolje via Kolasin and Bjelopolje and there join the troops withdrawing from Macedonia.
On 29.11.1944, the rear of this troop left Shkodra, but the positions in the north were maintained for some time. The 181st Infantry Division left Kotor on 21.11.1944. The march continued accompanied by fierce fighting with Tito's forces and was made even more difficult by the snowfall and a great flood that occurred on 11.12.1944 from which all the important bridges were destroyed.
Page 815. At the beginning of July, the Southeastern Command undertook a major operation to clear southern Albania of the communist gangs there, an operation which, under the leadership of Army Group E, which also took the 1st Mountain Division for help, achieved complete success and destroyed the connection that was being created with the central areas of the country.
Page 820. On 03.10.1944, Hitler issues the order for the withdrawal from Greece, southern Albania and southern Macedonia.
Page 821. ….. German troops leave on 12.10.1944 from Vlona, from Thessaloniki on 31.10.1944. Rearguards cross the Greek-Macedonian border on 1-2.11.1944. But in Albania, a new front was created on the Durrës-Elbasan line.
Page 822. To protect the Ibër river valley [in northern Kosovo – st. ed.] from the Bulgarians who were approaching from the south through the mountains of Kopanik, Group-Armata E gathered the Albanian national forces which under the German leadership wage an exemplary war.
…From October to mid-November 1944, the enemy advances with tremendous loss of men against our retreat defending. A special situation was created on 02.11.1944 and in the following days when three enemy Divisions and a Tank Brigade attacked north of Podujeva and broke through the Mërdara Pass. The important road junction of Pristina was greatly endangered. However, using the last reserves, it became possible within the evening of the same day to stop the advance and further attacks of the enemy.
Pages 822-823. The decisions of the south-eastern high command for the withdrawal of Army Group E are at the time when the II Tank Army is attacking in Drin and Srem. The vanguard was withdrawn from southern Macedonia; Veles was abandoned on 11.11.1944, Skopje on the night of 13/14.11.1944, the Bulgarians furiously re-attack north of Pristina on 20.11.1944.
Page 823. ….. The withdrawal of German troops to the north was delayed by at least 10 days due to numerous bandit activities in the area of Tirana. Therefore, the German troops left Tirana on 17.11.1944. On 20.11.1944, a force gathered in Podgorica, which is powerful enough to dare to attack Nikšić. But this attack fails and shows that even by bringing other parts of the XXI Corps it will be very difficult to break the front there.
Page 824. Splitting the front from the XXI Corps seems very difficult. After a powerful attack, the bridge in Bioçe [northeast, above Podgorica] was taken on 28.11.1944, which had to be repaired in very difficult conditions under the attack of enemy planes in order to enable the departure of most of the troops from Albania. Leaving Shkodra was possible only on 30.11.1944. Then you have to fight for every kilometer not only against the treacherous enemy but also against natural forces. On 12.12.1944, a great flood occurred which destroyed all the newly rebuilt bridges and thus delayed the withdrawal process. The English, who cooperated with the gangs, took this opportunity to follow the troops along the withdrawal route, being able to cause significant damage, especially to the cars of the marching columns, as they were waiting and in the open field.
Page 863. The German forces located in Albania are threatened to be separated from the union with other forces and according to the withdrawal order they leave on November 20, 1944 from Tirana, on November 29, 1944 from Shkodra and manage to join the Army Group on December 18, 1944 Which cleared the way for the union.
...After the withdrawal from Albania and Serbia, Army Group E took such a position that enables the withdrawal of the forces coming out of Bosnia-Herzegovina and which lies on the line Mostar-Višegrad-Drina.
Page 865. (Here the situation at the end of 1944 is described. - translation note) .... In the southeast, the USSR owns Romania, Bulgaria and Albania. Army Group E (Colonel General Alexander Löhr) still held parts of Croatia; Serbia was already under Tito. Half of Hungary was lost, Budapest was surrounded. German and Austrian territories were now directly threatened.
The enemy's struggle to prevent the exploitation of mineral wealth and other raw materials
Page 936. ...5. Another metal needed was chromium. The growing demands for it could be better and better met as the German army occupied the Balkans. Because in that way the possibility of using mines was created in Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and after the capitulation of Italy also in Albania.
Situation Books (01.01.1945 – 20.04.1945)
Page 1013 – 14.01.1945. Enemy situation in Croatia: Albanian units were left behind. The adversary is trying to send Serbian units northeast into the area south of Syrmia bypassing Slavonia [in Croatia].
Page 1184 – 19.03.1945. Politics: An English envoy has arrived in Albania and the British have asked Tito to withdraw his troops.
Notes of General Alfred Jodl in Nuremberg prison regarding Hitler's influence on the way the war was conducted
Page 1719. …English tanks pushed the Italian troops of General Rodolfo Graziani to the borders of Cyrenaica [the eastern region of Libya] and instead of Italy achieving a quick victory in Greece it was risking the loss of Albania. In that situation in Rome, the feeling of defeat came over pride, and calls for help reached Berlin. In that situation, Hitler decided: In the conditions of modern air warfare, the war had to be kept as far as possible from Germany's borders. He didn't want a clash with Greece, that's why he refused to help Italy in Albania. /Telegraph/
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