By: Xhezair Zaganjori

In previous articles, based mainly on the archival documentation of the German Foreign Ministry (Auswärtiges Amt), documentation that was considered “top secret” at the time, we have seen that in April 1939, the German Reich was completely indifferent to the Italian invasion of Albania. The political director general of this ministry, Ernst Woermann, who had received the Albanian ambassador in Berlin, the distinguished diplomat Rauf Fico, that same day, wrote to his superiors on April 5, 1939 that I had told the ambassador that “... he should know that German-Italian relations are very close ...” and that “Germany has no direct interests in the Adriatic ...”, since Italy will be present there ... Likewise, the German ambassador in Tirana, Pannwitz, was instructed by his deputy foreign minister, Ernst von Weizswcker, to “... not take any action that would call into question our unrestricted consent to the actions of the Italians in Albania”. Not only that, but on April 15, 1939, the number two of the German Reich, Hermann Göring, would send a telegram to Mussolini on behalf of Hitler, through which he sent him "... Heartiest congratulations for the settlement of the Albanian problem (albanische Angelegenheit)".

This indifference of Hitler in the Balkans would change radically two years later. Initially prompted by the failures of the Italian military operation against Greece and then by political developments in Yugoslavia, where on March 27, 1941, Yugoslav military personnel supported by Britain forced Prince Regent Paul, who had signed a Cooperation Pact with the Axis Powers two days earlier (March 25), to abdicate the Yugoslav royal throne, to pass it on to Prince Peter II, with the argument that he had now reached the age of majority of 18. Naturally, the young prince was oriented towards cooperation with the Allied Forces. Hitler considered this action a coup d'état, so while postponing the attack against the former Soviet Union, he ordered preparations to undertake the military operation Balkan Campaign (Balkanfelzug) about 10 days later, on April 6, 1941, through which Yugoslavia and Greece were invaded. In this operation, German forces were also supported by troops from some of the other allies in the Central Axis coalition, specifically Italy, Bulgaria and Hungary.

In addition to the above, German interest in the Balkans, and especially in Albania, would increase significantly in the following period. The decisive factor was the success of the Allied Forces in North Africa and the landing of Anglo-American forces in Sicily (July 10 - August 17, 1943) through Operation Husky. In this situation, Hitler created the conviction that after the rapid capitulation of Italy, taking advantage of Albania's geographical position near the Otranto Channel, as well as the gap that would be created by the departure of Italian troops, the Allied Forces would land on the Albanian coast to undertake military actions against the Wehrmacht from there. For these reasons, the German Reich thought of taking urgent measures to put the Albanian coastline under complete control, at a time when the situation in Albania was not well known. To achieve this goal, unlike Italy, which in the period April 1939 - September 1943, simply turned Albania into a colony, initially under the guise of a protectorate and then into that of a Personal Union under the crown of Victor Emmanuel III, Germany planned and implemented a strategy that was formally based on the re-declaration, re-creation and guarantee of an independent Albanian state, which was to be led by a government that would be "cooperative and friendly" with the Reich, that is, it was to be a puppet or quisling government, as had been done in some of the European territories occupied by the Wehrmacht.

Of course, the Hitlerite government could not in any case cooperate for this purpose with the communist forces, which Hitler fought everywhere without hesitation, so the main target of its "hunt or lure" for cooperation would be mainly the intellectual classes and nationalist forces, which were inclined or more exposed to idealistically dreaming of national unification. This group should have included in particular the numerous intellectuals and nationalists who had strongly opposed the Italian invasion from the beginning, and who were precisely for this reason left unemployed, persecuted and exiled by the Mussolini government. On the other hand, it seems clear that in the case of Albania, in addition to the nationalist forces within the borders defined by the London Conference of 1913 (Old Albania), special cooperation would be required, especially with the nationalist forces of the Albanian lands left outside the mother country by this conference, which with the help of Germany were to be united with Albania, thus creating in 1943, with the seductive name, the so-called New Albania. It was necessary to "work" so that the inhabitants of these lands would see the Germans as true liberators. Only in this way could the loyalty of the intellectual classes and Albanian nationalist forces inside and outside the country be guaranteed.

ALLIED FORCES

The Nazi leadership's drive in this direction was also dictated by the continuous growth of Albanian sympathy for the Allied Forces, which certainly had a great interest in having the widest possible moral and practical support in the war against the Central Axis. This is also evident in the important declarations that the three main Allied Powers made about Albania in December 1942, a time when, in reality, after the victories on the Soviet front and the first successful Anglo-American landing in North Africa (November 8, 1942), their counteroffensive against the Axis began in earnest.

Thus, on December 10, 1942, the US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, would make a statement, in which it was stated that, “The US Government is not indifferent to the continued resistance of the Albanian people against the Italian invaders. The efforts of the various guerrilla forces operating against the common enemy in Albania are to be admired and highly appreciated. The American Government and people are eagerly awaiting the day when they can give effective military assistance to these brave men, who want to drive the invader from their country”. On December 17, the British Secretary of State, Anthony Iden, also made a similar statement in the House of Commons, emphasizing that, “His Majesty's Government expresses its deep sympathy for the Albanians, a people who have been among the first victims of fascist aggression. We therefore desire that Albania be freed from the Italian yoke and re-declared its independence”. On December 19, 1942, the Soviet government also made a statement, stating that “The Soviet Union fully supports the courageous struggle for freedom of the Albanian patriots against the Italian invaders and does not recognize any claims of the Italian imperialists against Albania ... The Soviet government is certain that the struggle for independence of the Albanian people will join the struggle of the other peoples of the Balkans against the Italian-German invaders”. Despite the nuances, it seems clear that in essence, in all three declarations of the Allied Powers, the aim was to further expand the widest possible popular sympathy and support against the Central Axis Powers, and especially against Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, in Albania. This increased attention of the Allied Forces towards Albania would also have an impact on the Albanian territories. Not in vain, Victor Emmanuel's viceroy in Albania, Francesco Jacomoni, would tell the German consul in Tirana at the beginning of February 1943 that recently "the hostility of the Albanians against Italy has increased greatly, because their faith in the Axis victory has lost more and more ground. It is now fashionable in Albania to listen to Radio London".

But, as we have emphasized, in July-August 1943, Hitler was forced to implement the new strategy for Albania, with the main focus on preventing the landing of Allied Forces on the Albanian coast. In implementation of these ideas is also the secret telegram that Foreign Minister Joachim Ribbentrop, one of Hitler's closest associates, sent to the German Embassy in Rome on August 21, 1943 (i.e. four days after the Allied landing in Sicily), with the order that it (the telegram) be given to the German Consul General in Tirana, Martin Schliep. Among other things, Ribbentrop asked Schliep to report in detail regarding: a) The political situation in Albania, giving his opinion on who could lead the new Albanian government in the near future, which "must have clear objectives"; b) How is the situation regarding the realization of the main mission of the arrival of German troops, which is the control and security of the Albanian coast; c) To calm the Albanians politically with the argument that the mission of the German soldiers is temporary; d) To give an opinion on how the declaration of independence of New Albania and its government, which "should be positive" towards the Reich, would be organized. For this purpose, an Albanian personality had to be found, who, with German political and military support, would take over the leadership of the country; and others.

“ACTIVE COOPERATION”

Two days later, in response to the above telegram, Consul Schliep would express skepticism regarding “active cooperation” with the Albanians at this stage, so he proposed that initially his colleague at the consulate, Franz von Scheiger, who had arrived in Tirana only a month earlier, be sent to Kosovo as soon as possible for this purpose. He adds that Scheiger knew the geographical terrain and the political and economic situation in the Albanian space, especially in Kosovo, very well. He had been in these lands as an officer of the Austro-Hungarian army during the First World War and had remained there even after the end of this war, studying Albanian history, language and culture. He spoke Albanian very well and had contacts with personalities of Albanian political, scientific and cultural life. In 1923 he had also worked as a commercial attaché at the first German embassy in Tirana. Based on this proposal, at the end of August 1943 Scheiger would immediately go on a special mission to Kosovo, with the task of recruiting as many figures in the political and social life of New Albania as possible through promises of German assistance for the realization of independence and national unification. He would move mainly on foot, wearing a military uniform, a radio transmitter (Funkgerate) and, according to some German authors, he would also have about six kilograms of gold coins with him.

THE ALBANIAN ISSUE

In parallel with these measures, at the end of August 1943, several very important organizational changes were made at Hitler's Central Headquarters in Berlin. Among other things, Ambassador Karl Ritter, close to Ribbentrop and an important leader of the German Foreign Ministry (he had participated in the preparation of the Anschluss with Austria in March 1938; the infamous Munich Agreement of September 30, 1938 to hand over the Sudetenland region to Hitler; the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement of August 24, 1939 for the division of Poland and other territories in Northern Europe, and others), was to give priority to the Albanian issue during its discussion at the Central Headquarters. Likewise, the high-ranking German diplomat and officer, Franz von Sonnleithner, would also appear at this headquarters on the Albanian issue (a year later, on August 20, 1944, this high-ranking officer would be present, but unharmed, in the assassination attempt with the explosion of a time bomb that was made on Hitler in Berlin, in a room where he and several members of his Headquarters were discussing the Wehrmacht's plans). In addition to the above, on August 24, 1943, Hitler would appoint the Austrian and Nazi diplomat, Hermann Neubacher, as the Reich's special envoy for Southeast Europe, with headquarters in Belgrade, but who was to pursue the Albanian issue as a priority.

In this capacity, Neubacher would arrive in Belgrade on September 8, 1943, and the next day, September 9, he would respond with a secret telegram to several issues raised the day before by Ribbentrop, which had been conveyed to him from Berlin, through Ambassador Karl Ritter. In this response, among other things Neubacher emphasizes: “1) Tomorrow I will leave Belgrade for Tirana, since the airport is already in our hands, despite the hesitation of the commander-in-chief of the Italian troops to surrender their weapons. However, for safety, a company of paratroopers has also gone there today. Other paratroopers will be there tomorrow. I have agreed with General von Weich to be ready at any moment to support us in case of need ...; 2) Today I spoke with some reliable Albanians about the political situation in the country. They were enthusiastic and appreciated our arrival as a historic moment for their nation. They also supported ... my statement that the success of the Albanian nation can only be guaranteed through close and sincere cooperation with us ...; 3) Due to the statement made by the commander of the German forces in the Balkans that immediately after the invasion of Albania and Montenegro, all executive power should be taken over by the German army, after discussing it with General von Weichs ... I recommend that these two cases should be treated in different ways. In Albania we should give up the creation of many military mechanisms, leaving most of them to the local government. The political slogan "Independent Albania" should not be violated by the usual political scheme of creating our military administration ...; 4) For political reasons I am against the idea that for security, German troops should cooperate with Bulgarian forces (this concerns the area of ​​Mitrovica and Podujeva - our note). I have pointed out that this cooperation should be done with Albanian forces ...; 5) Von Scheiger arrived today from Kosovo in Belgrade. Tomorrow he will accompany me by plane to Tirana.

Meanwhile, many changes had taken place in Italy. Just five days after the start of the Allied landings in Sicily, on July 15, 1943, the Italian Fascist Council would dismiss Mussolini, who would then be isolated (interned) by order of Victor Emmanuel. The Prime Minister of the Fascist Government would be Marshal Pietro Badoglio, who would immediately enter into armistice talks with the Allied Forces (Anglo-American), initially through diplomatic channels in Lisbon, Portugal, and then at the military level, in the Sicilian village or town of Cassibile, south of Syracuse. In this town, the Armistice Agreement of Cassibile (Waffenstillstand von Cassibile) would also be signed on September 3, 1943. Initially, it was decided that this would be kept secret. However, it would only be officially recognized five days later, on September 8, 1943, through a statement made at 6:00 PM on Radio “Algiers” by the Supreme Allied Commander, American General Dwight Eisenhower, and a little later, at 7:42 PM, by Prime Minister Badoglio. In addition to the armistice, the agreement also provided for Italy’s withdrawal from the Central Axis Coalition. For these reasons, September 8, 1943 is often considered the day of the capitulation of Fascist Italy.

Hitler would react immediately. After invading Albania the next day, on September 9, a day later, on September 10, 1943, with the operation codenamed “Axle Affair” (Unternehmen Achse) he invaded Rome and Northern Italy, under the leadership of the Elite Division commanded by the renowned German general, Erwin Rommel. Also, on September 12, 1943, he ordered the development of Operation “Eiche” to free Mussolini from isolation. He would immediately meet Hitler and under his “regime”, on September 23, he would form the new puppet government, the “Italian Social Republic”. This government would formally fall on April 25, 1944. Three days later, on April 28, Mussolini and his girlfriend, Claretta Petacci, would be caught in disguise near the border, fleeing in a military truck towards Germany. Both were immediately executed by Italian partisans.

As in Italy, the situation in Albania was chaotic. Immediately after the capitulation of Italy, on the evening of September 8, the chief of the Wehrmacht Coordination Staff in the Balkans, General Hans Bessek, rushed to ask the commander of the Italian troops in our country, General Ezio Rossi, to surrender and keep under surveillance all Italian soldiers and officers who were in Albania. The Italian general would hesitate at first, but then he was forced to give his consent and so, on September 9, 1943, numerous German troops from Yugoslavia and Greece marched towards Albania, immediately placing the Albanian coast and airports under special control. The fate of the Italian soldiers would be quite depressing. Most of them would surrender their weapons and would be isolated from German forces. Another significant part would head for Saranda, in the hope that they would have an easier time crossing into Italy. Most of them would also surrender their weapons to the partisan forces, thinking that they would be helped by them to cross to the other side of Otranto. By order of Hitler, the order was given that such cases should be identified as soon as possible and the responsible persons should be shot. This tragedy of the Italian soldiers would later constitute one of the charges with which some of the Nazi leaders were faced at the Nuremberg Trials (Trial for the Massacres in Southeast Europe). Finally, a small part of the Italian troops would join the partisans, creating the "Antonio Gramsci" Battalion.

Throughout this intense period, Nazi diplomacy was also operating rapidly in Albania. The main source of information and their cooperation for the creation of the new Albanian government were the contacts they had at this time, especially with Xhafer Deva, who came from a patriotic family from Mitrovica in Kosovo, who had studied at the American College of Istanbul, as well as with Vehbi Frashëri, the son of the well-known Albanian patriot and nationalist Mehdi Frashëri. According to some German authors, both (Deva and Frashëri) had long had contacts with the Nazi authorities, so they had also acquired the status of “V-Person” (Vertrauensperson), which means they were trusted for the intelligence service of the German Reich.

In this regard, the employee of the German Consulate in Tirana, Franz von Scheiger, mentioned above, must have played an important role. It was precisely these people who must have proposed to the Nazi authorities to put Mehdi Frashëri “in charge of affairs in Albania”, who, although he was 71 years old at the time, was distinguished as an outstanding jurist (the Albanian delegate to the League of Nations and the Conference of Ambassadors of 1921, where the independence of the Albanian state and the borders defined in London in 1913 were reaffirmed), and a person of integrity, who, according to Neubacher, “was not attracted or influenced in his positions by positions, money or threats from the Italians”. He had called for armed resistance to the Italian occupation and had consistently opposed their rule in Albania. He thought that the Albanians had to act quickly, since with the seizure of sovereignty by Fascist Italy, after the war, the Albanian territories would serve as market spoils for neighboring countries. For these reasons, Mussolini's government had taken Frashëri to Italy and kept him under surveillance (restricted movements) at the "Victoria" hotel in Rome. Mehdi was accompanied there by his daughter, Mediha Frashëri.

These ideas are clearly conveyed in Karl Ritter's telegram in Berlin on September 11, 1943, to the German ambassador in Rome, which states: "1) The Albanian political personality Mehdi Frashëri is expected to play an important role in the New Albanian Government. Some time ago he was taken by the Italians out of Albania and is being held under surveillance in Rome, at the 'Victoria' hotel. We do not know if he is still there. You must find him as soon as possible and send him by plane to Tirana. For security purposes, he should be accompanied by one person. In Tirana, hand over Mr. Frashëri to the special envoy Hermann Neubacher, to the consul general Martin Schliep, or to Major Franz von Scheiger; 2) For political and military purposes, in Albania we need large amounts of money in Albanian currency. Therefore, try to get as many Albanian banknotes as possible that are in the Bank of Rome, in order to send them by plane to Tirana as soon as possible. If possible, send them on the same plane that Mehdi will fly on. Frashëri, but nevertheless, he should have no knowledge at all about the shipment of this money..."!

Berlin, in a second telegram to the Embassy in Rome, requests "that everything possible be done to obtain as many Albanian banknotes as possible to send to Tirana ... and to secure as well as possible at the 'Banka di Roma' the machinery that produces Albanian banknotes, so that we can use it as soon as possible. Whether this machinery will have to be used later in Tirana depends on developments in Albania".

Following the two above-mentioned telegrams, on September 16, 1943, around midnight, the German Embassy in Rome informed Ambassador Ritter that: “1) ... tomorrow morning, September 17, accompanied by a German officer and an employee of our embassy, ​​Mehdi Frashëri will depart by plane for Tirana. There we will immediately send him to the special envoy Neubacher, or Consul Schliep ...; 2) The seizure of the gold and banknotes was successfully carried out today through a surprise operation by an SS Commando, in the presence of a Nazi foreign service official. From this operation, the following values ​​were taken: a) Albanian banknotes in various denominations worth 120.513.902 gold francs; b) Gold coins in 23 small bags, worth 435.070 gold francs; c) Gold ingots in 49 boxes (losen Barren) and 29 smaller boxes (Kistchen Barren) which, according to Italian documents, have a value of around 7.627.756.90 gold francs".

As is known, the banknotes were sent the next day by plane to Tirana, together with Mehdi Frashëri. The gold was sent to Berlin. It was found by the Allies in the Merkers Salt Mines, in Berlin in May 1945.

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

Returning again to Neubacher's engagements as the Reich's special envoy for Southeastern Europe, we recall that in this capacity he arrived in the Yugoslav capital on 8 September 1943, the day when Eisenhower and Badoglio announced the Armistice of Cassibile. A day later, on 9 September 1943, Neubacher informed Ambassador Ritter at the Nazi Central Headquarters that he would go to Albania the following day, on 10 September, ready to implement the plan for the declaration of Albania's independence and its unification with the other Albanian territories, elaborated by the Central Headquarters in Berlin with the will and knowledge of Hitler and Goebbels (their conversation on this subject is documented as a document in the Keesigs Archiv der Gegenwart). In fact, for technical reasons, the flight was postponed to 11 September. On this day, accompanied by Major Franz von Scheiger, Neubacher departed from Belgrade on a Heinkel III aircraft to fly to Albania (Tirana) for the first time. The aircraft was accompanied by three other German JU52 aircraft, carrying 60 soldiers from the Brandenburg Division.

According to Neubacher, on another German plane, Storch, Xhafer Deva had also arrived in Tirana from Mitrovica that same day. Neubacher's immediate tasks in Albania would be to create a National Committee with the capacity of a Provisional Government, which was to declare the independence of New Albania as soon as possible. After this step, the National Committee was to convene the National Assembly of the Albanian state. Upon arriving in Tirana, Neubacher immediately received information on the issue of creating the National Committee. According to this information, two main groups were present on this issue, one represented by Ibrahim Bey Biçaku, who had studied in Vienna (he was the son of the great Albanian patriot Aqif Pasha of Elbasan), while the other group was represented by Xhafer Deva. There were numerous disagreements between them regarding the functioning of this mechanism.

After much discussion, on September 14, the two groups agreed that the National Committee would consist of “20 well-known political figures respected by the people” and that Ibrahim Bey Biçaku would be placed at the head of this Committee, who would thus also be the prime minister of this Provisional Government. Xhafer Deva would be the Minister of the Interior. On this same day, September 14, 1943, the National Committee, through a declaration written by Neubacher and approved by the Central Headquarters in Berlin, declared the independence of New Albania, which would include in its territory Kosovo, the Albanian lands in Serbia and Macedonia, as well as Chameria. At dinner, a delegation of this Committee was received by Neubacher at the German Consulate in Tirana, who presented him with the request that New Albania be recognized by the Reich as soon as possible. Neubacher recalls that he promised to do so quickly, which caused “enthusiasm among the Albanian delegation.” But he also recalls cynically that “this happiness for this historic day was interrupted when the wife of the consul general, as hostess, opened two bottles of champagne, which were eagerly received by the eager fathers of the Albanian nation.” The next day, September 15, Neubacher was to leave for Belgrade and, after preparing a report on developments in Albania, on September 16 he left for Central Headquarters in Berlin. According to him, Hitler was very pleased with these positive developments in “the last romantic corner of Europe.”

From Berlin, Neubacher would quickly return to Belgrade and from there, on September 20, 1943, he would send Ribbentrop this telegram: "As soon as I arrived in Belgrade, I was informed by my collaborators in Tirana that these days the communist and English propaganda against the National Committee has reached its peak. Last week, several British officers were parachuted into Central Albania. There is also a noticeable increase in Anglophile sympathizers in Albanian cities. Under these circumstances, the New Albanian Government is in great need of our support."

NATIONAL COMMITTEE

Afterwards, Neubacher would depart for Albania and the above information would be further supplemented 5 days later, on September 25, 1943, through a relatively long telegram that he sent from Tirana to Ambassador Ritter in Berlin. It says: “1) Due to the losses on various fronts in Europe, in Old Albania, especially in the cities, negative assessments of the German troops currently prevail. Most of them hope for a quick landing of the Allied Troops in Albania. For these reasons, we have encountered many difficulties in communication, even with our sympathizers from the upper strata of the population, who, due to their family name and the properties they have, greatly influence the broadest support that should be given to the National Committee ... Today I had a long conversation on this subject with Mehdi Frashëri, who presented the same concerns to me ... Mehdi Frashëri came from Rome with the belief that together with his influential friends in Albania, he would create a national government, but recently he has withdrawn a little, because he feels disappointed by the general situation of the war in Europe. However, there may be some relief in this matter, since there is an opinion that the possible landing of the Allied Troops in Albania cannot take place at least until the end of this year (1943); 2) The internal situation in Albania has deteriorated in recent days due to the anarchic disbandment of the Italian divisions. A communist gang attacked German troops a few days ago near Kruja. Therefore, I once again instructed Mr. von Scheiger to engage with all his forces in preparing the holding of the National Assembly that is scheduled to be organized on October 4, 1943. If there are obstacles to this goal from our enemies, we will be forced to postpone it until later.

On September 25, 1943, Neubacher would send another telegram from Tirana to Ambassador Ritter, in which he emphasized that “together with General Geib and Consul General Schliep, we met last night, September 24, at 21:00 PM, the President of the Albanian National Committee, who heads the Provisional Government. I handed him the written statement of the Reich Government in support of the National Committee. Prime Minister Biçaku accepted the statement with pleasure, noting the sympathy of the Albanians towards the New Germany and its Führer”. The telegram is short and very formal, but Neubacher points out the manipulation and the ridiculous situation surrounding its presentation to “Albanian dignitaries”. According to him, in the process of presenting such documents there are formalities that are much more appreciated in Eastern countries than in the West. Therefore, this telegram had to be reprinted, sewn with twine into a serious file and sealed. Miss Lützen, at the Consulate, tried to invent something, but without success. However, a “solution” was found. At the end of the statement, it was noted that the original copy of this document would be kept in the archive of the German Consulate in Tirana. This argument was also conveyed verbally to the Albanian side and ... the matter was closed. However, we clarify again that the above statement was not accompanied by official recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations with New Albania. This action would only be taken on July 12, 1944.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

As Neubacher had predicted in his telegram of September 25, sent to Berlin, the proceedings of the National Assembly did not begin on October 4, but were postponed until later. In practice, its proceedings took place from October 16 to 23, 1943, in the Royal Palace (today the Palace of the Brigades). The Assembly had about 250 delegates coming from all Albanian lands. Neubacher describes in detail the proceedings of the Assembly, noting, among other things, that from the beginning, it elected as its president the prominent scholar from Elbasan and Albanian patriot, Lef Nosi, a signatory of the Declaration of Independence on November 28, 1912. Subsequently, the Assembly declared support for the Axis Powers and annulled all legal acts adopted during the Italian occupation, which were contrary to the interests of the country. With the office of the head of state, the High Council of the Regency was elected with four persons, who were to represent the four main faiths in Albania. Specifically, Mehdi Frashëri of the Bektashi faith was elected as the First Chairman, who, despite his hesitations in accepting this duty, was "moved" and forced to surrender by the "ardent calls" of the participants in the Assembly. The other three were Lef Nosi of the Orthodox faith, Father Anton Harapi of the Christian faith and the Dibrani patriot Fuat Dibra of the Muslim faith. The Chairman of the Regency was expected to be on a one-year rotation, but in practice only Mehdi Frashëri remained in this position, as Lef Nosi and Fuat Dibra were very ill (Fuat Dibra would pass away at the end of February 1944), while the prominent scholar and patriot Father Anton Harapi initially did not participate because he was waiting for the Vatican's consent for this position, which was granted on January 13, 1944. However, he would declare again that he would not exercise the position of Chairman of the Regency under any circumstances, since in this position he would have to definitively confirm cases of death sentences by the country's courts, which was contrary to the Christian faith.

Then, the National Assembly elected the New Government that would replace the Provisional Executive Committee. The Prime Minister would be the patriot Rexhep Mitrovica, while Xhafer Deva remained Minister of the Interior. Ago Agaj was elected Minister of Economy, Bahri Omari Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Vehbi Frashëri Secretary of State. In the end, it was agreed that the National Assembly would return to the National Assembly. Since Lef Nosi was appointed Regency, the Korçë patriot Idhomene Kosturi was elected Speaker of the Assembly, who would soon, on November 5, 1943, be killed in the street by a young man who, according to the court process, had taken this “task” from the guerrilla unit of the city of Durrës. Neubacher notes that the Assembly’s proceedings were successful and took place in a peaceful atmosphere, with the exception of an incident on October 18 that caused brief confusion. He explains that it was a group of partisans who fired an Italian cannon from a distance in the direction of the Royal Palace where the Assembly was. However, according to him, “German soldiers quickly intervened, who immediately restored order and calm.” Given these developments, on November 30, 1943, Victor Emmanuel himself would renounce the title of King of Albania.

Although all these changes were made and the Parliament and Government of New Albania were created, the connection and dependence on the German occupying authorities was not only very great, but also multiple. When they sought their direct interests, they exercised executive power at all levels every day. At least four German authorities simultaneously presented themselves as the most important, without any hierarchical relations between them. a) Martin Schliep was consul general, but practically he was the German ambassador to Albania, despite the fact that formally he would receive this title on July 12, 1944; b) Neubacher was a special envoy of the German Reich in Southeast Europe, with a special focus on managing the situation in Albania; c) General Josef Fitzthum, since October 1943, acted independently in the function of Himmler's special envoy, to direct the service of the SS and Gestapo troops in Albania; d) According to the Nazi protocol, prepared by the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, after the occupation of a country, one of the generals of the occupying troops was to also perform the duty of military commander-in-chief, as the highest executive authority in that territorial area. This was also decided for Albania.

However, after Neubacher's intervention, in order to avoid any misunderstanding about the "authority and independence" of the newly created institutions in New Albania, official Berlin, as it had previously done in Croatia and Slovakia, made the exception to formally name this function no longer as the "General Military Commander in Albania", but only as the "German General for Albania". This task would be carried out in turn in our country, initially by the General of the 21st Corps, Paul Bader, and then by the General of the Tank Corps, Gustav Fehn, and the General of the Artillery, Theodor Geib. It was precisely this authority of the German occupying forces that had to continuously present to the "friendly government" the demands and interests of the German Wehrmacht. And, these demands and interests also included the adoption of legal acts, financial support, the creation of special courts, the issuance of orders to local authorities and others. One should not forget here, in particular, the organization of the robbery of Albania's underground resources, just as the Italians had done.

Despite the fact that the Germans officially said that they were transients and were only interested in the security of the coast, in practice they were also very interested in the minerals of New Albania, especially chrome, copper, iron, bauxite, the Trepça mines, etc. The architect and close friend of Hitler, Albert Speer, now Minister of Armaments, was insistently looking for chrome in particular, as he needed it as soon as possible for the production of fighter planes, tanks, submarines, ships and heavy artillery. And this had to be organized and controlled especially by the German military forces, especially since the mountainous terrain of the country “created the opportunity for the partisans to make it difficult or even prevent the smooth and rapid transport of minerals towards the Albanian ports”. This “intersection” of interests through the not at all sincere management of the German invaders, is also clearly visible in Neubacher’s telegram, which he sent from Belgrade to the Central Headquarters in Berlin on January 31, 1944. It states that "through strong strikes, communist terror in Albania has been greatly reduced. The march of the Minister of the Interior, Xhaver Deva, with about 1500 Kosovars in the direction of Prizren, Shkodra and Tirana, aims at their elimination. We have supported this action of the 'National Front' against terrorist gangs in Southern Albania with weapons and ammunition. Other actions of the 'National Forces' in the North and East of Albania have severely damaged our communist opponents". And, the massacres of Xhafer Deva's troops would occur immediately, initially in Shkodra (where according to Neubacher a good part of the communists managed to escape because they had taken refuge in the city's Catholic Mission), and then in Tirana. After a failed assassination attempt against Xhafer Deva in Tirana on February 3, 1944, in which one of his nephews who was accompanying him was killed, early the next morning, February 4, 1944, his forces would kill 84 Tirana citizens (!) in front of their families. This terror in the capital would also make a negative impression on the German military themselves, many of whom remember that throughout February and into early March of this year (1944), a triangle stood in Skanderbeg Square for hanging opponents and almost every morning "there were bloody corpses there, so that the surrounding area looked like a butcher's shop."

All of this sparked revolt and discontent not only among the people, but also within the quisling government itself. Mehdi Frashëri, as chairman of the High Council of the Regency, began to have numerous disagreements with Xhafer Deva due to the latter's extremist positions. On the other hand, Deva accused Frashëri of being unfaithful, of not keeping his word.

Under these conditions, only a month and a half after the telegram of January 31, at the request of Ambassador Ritter in Berlin, dated March 16, 1944, Neubacher was forced to send a second telegram, describing the causes of the intensification of the war against German forces in Albania. Listing the main arguments, this telegram states that the causes of this new situation are “a) The strengthening of the activity of the British Military Mission, especially along the Vlora-Saranda coastline. It should be added that in other parts of Albanian territory, troops of British agents have managed to penetrate through the sea, making particular use of the Otranto Channel. Other British agents and, apparently, American and Russian officers and agents have also managed to penetrate Albania through the air; b) Through the above agents, it has been possible for the Albanian gangs to be supplied again with weapons, ammunition and gold; c) The increase in enemy propaganda, also due to the imminent landing of the Allied Forces; d) Military successes on the Soviet Front. All of these have caused the communist forces to accelerate towards the north of the country, currently controlling the territory up to the Elbasan-Struga road ... Their further advance towards the north in the Mat-Dibar area is currently opposed by Zogist troops ... In Berat there are fights between communists and national groups. In the area of ​​South Tirana, the gang commanded by the now well-known leader Myslim Peza remains very active... There continue to be disagreements between nationalist groups."

It should be noted, however, that at the beginning of April 1944 there was an interesting development, thanks to the commitment of Vehbi Frashëri. As everywhere in the occupied territories, in order to finance the stay and activity of the troops in our country, the German Government prepared to touch the Albanian gold that had been looted by them in Rome on September 16, 1943. For this purpose, they imposed an agreement on the Albanian Government signed on December 28, 1943. But, Vehbi Frashëri would immediately intervene with the German authorities, convincing them to withdraw from this idea. Thus, on April 6, 1944, Vehbi Frashëri would sign a new agreement on this issue in Berlin with the Director General of the German Foreign Ministry, Emil Wiehl. Through it, it was agreed that the gold would not be used by the Germans, but would be transferred to the Albanian National Bank. However, "its storage had to continue in the German capital, until the end of the war." This new arrangement served not only to keep this amount of gold intact, but also to later deal with this issue, based on the principles and norms of international law. In the conditions of this anarchy and lack of "control" over Albanian territory, Heinrich Himmler, commander-in-chief of the elite SS troops, known for their inhuman and notorious deeds in Germany and beyond (especially in the Nazi concentration camps), had the idea of ​​creating a special SS division in Albania, with local recruits, who would be available at any moment to suppress or brutally fight the opponents of the German Wehrmacht.

And, for this purpose, the recruitment of Kosovars was thought to be the best and easiest solution, since they, having been under Serbian rule for decades, could be deceived and manipulated more quickly through the evidence of nationalist sentiments, mentioned above. Neubacher says in his memoirs that he was initially against this idea, because he considered that the creation of this division would be poorly received by the majority of Albanians, since it practically contradicted the status and promises that had been made to the Government of New Albania. However, Himmler managed to obtain Hitler's consent in writing. It was decided that this body of Kosovar recruits would be called the 21st SS Mountain Division, "Skënderbeg". Its center would be in Prizren and formally the activity would have to take place within the territory of New Albania. For propaganda purposes, this element was also attempted to be “clarified” by the German Consul General in Tirana, Martin Schliep, when on June 28, 1944, he declared that “this Division will only be active on Albanian territory”. This statement was in fact made in support of the “response” that the Albanian government had given on this issue in mid-June 1944 to a statement by the Commander-in-Chief of the American Forces in the Mediterranean, General Henry Maitland Wilson. Specifically, at the beginning of June he had declared that “... the Government of Tirana, in violation of international law, is violating its neutrality by recruiting troops to support the Wehrmacht’s military operations in the Balkans”. The Albanian government would react immediately, but without concrete arguments, simply pointing out that it “would never recruit troops to support the German army ... and that the actions of a defensive nature ... against communist terrorists were carried out in the exercise of the right of self-defense”.

According to Neubacher, the Albanian government intended to use these troops later as the nucleus for the creation of police forces and a national army. But both the Germans and the Albanian government “had no luck at all” with the SS division. They were not helped by the speculation with the name of Skanderbeg. In his book entitled “In Support of Germany” by author Hans Neulen, it is stated, among other things, that although several thousand Kosovars were initially registered in this division, most, after receiving the uniform, new weapons and ammunition (which they were very interested in), immediately left on foot through the mountains, towards their settlements. The remainder managed to carry out some sporadic action, often in cooperation with German troops, without distinguishing themselves much in the fighting. This book also quotes the report of a German soldier fighting on the front line (deutsche Frontsoldat) who, referring to the fighters of the "Skanderbeg" Division, notes that "they are more afraid of a discarded tin can, which previously contained pork, than of a hand grenade" which, apparently, they passed around to each other as if it were a toy.

The above is also noticeable in the debate on the issue of the status of New Albania, a topic that was particularly dear to Mehdi Frashëri. Taking into account the experience of the Peace Conference of 1919, in which he himself had participated with great success as a delegate of the Albanian state, Mehdi constantly insisted to the German authorities that New Albania be recognized as a neutral state by both the Central Axis and the Allied Powers. According to him, this would also avoid the further fragmentation of Albanian lands after World War II, and would also create the opportunity for Albania, as an occupied country, to participate in the Allied Commission for Italy, demanding reparations from it. Neubacher presented this issue by telegram to Mr. Ritter in Berlin on October 8, 1943. It states that “Mr. Mehdi Frashëri has come to me twice with the request that the Reich Government consider one of the following two options regarding the neutrality of Albania: 1) According to the first option, Germany and the Allies should officially recognize the neutrality of the Albanian state, which means that for both sides Albania will not be considered a war zone. Regarding this option, I told Mr. Frashëri that it is completely impossible for us to make this beautiful dream of the Albanians a reality...: 2) According to the second option, in order to calm enemy propaganda, Mehdi Frashëri proposes finding some formulation through which the neutral character of Independent Albania would be indirectly given. According to him, this formulation should be adapted as best as possible to the German concept of 'nicht kriegfuhrend' (not a belligerent party) in the current war. Regarding this option, I told him that I understand the political importance of this formulation for enemy propaganda, since you are afraid that Germany will also pull you to the war front. But, I guarantee you that Germany in no way even thinks of using Albanian soldiers against its enemies.” However, Mehdi Frashëri did not share this topic.

Therefore, in January 1944, he again addressed Neubacher, strongly emphasizing the interest not only of Albania, but also of Germany in this matter. Frashëri points out, among other things, that “practically Albania is in a state of relative neutrality, as he considers that the German troops have come there simply for their military needs, to protect themselves from a possible landing of the Allies on the Albanian coast. According to him, the Albanians treat the Germans as friends, despite the fact that they themselves are neutral in the war that has broken out between the European powers ... This means that if Germany's enemies come and attack it with regular military units, Albania will remain neutral”. According to Neubacher, with these positions Mehdi Frashëri seeks to "be innovative and invent norms of international law", as he compares the current case of Albania with that of Egypt in 1922. More specifically, it is about the liberation movement in Egypt in 1919, to free itself from the British protectorate established in 1914. Britain was initially against this movement. However, after secret negotiations with Egyptian nationalists, through a unilateral declaration by Britain made on February 28, 1922, Egypt's independence and neutrality were recognized, on the condition that this state respect some "vital interests" of the British there, among which was the military presence and the opening and control of the Suez Canal. Therefore, Egypt's neutrality would be conditional, or in other words, relative.

But, to this proposal of Frashëri, Neubacher makes an essential change, which is at the same time cynical. He defines not neutrality, but the sovereignty of the new Albanian State as "relative sovereignty", noting that despite the fact that German troops are treated by the Albanians as friends ... the sovereignty of the Albanian Government has an important limitation, which means that the German army would be forced to oppose any government that collaborates with its enemies. Of course, through this clarification, Neubacher indirectly wanted to point out that any German military interest in the New Albania has absolute priority over any sovereign right of the Albanian state. This message would also be conveyed by Ribbentrop in June 1944, when he was informed about the response of the Albanian Government to the statement of the American General Watson regarding the creation of the SS Division "Skënderbeg", mentioned above. Irritated by this response, he would emphasize that with this stance the Albanian Government had gone too far, and that “... it is unimaginable that a government of a country that thanks the German Reich for its generous policy and support for its independence, would enter into contacts with our enemies, even speaking out against us”. Mehdi Frashëri would try again and again to show with actions that the Albanian Government was independent and not a tool in the hands of the Germans. He used the governmental crisis of May-June 1944 for this purpose. Regarding this crisis, Neubacher would officially notify Berlin from Athens on May 27, 1944.

It states that “Albania is experiencing a government crisis. The High Council of Regency is also closely cooperating with the leader of the Zogists, Abaz Kupi, the captain of Mirdita, Gjon Marka Gjoni, and the leader of Dibra, Fiqiri Dine. All of them have concluded an anti-communist pact. On the other hand, the very weak and very sick Prime Minister, Rexhep Mitrovica, can no longer remain in office. There is also a strong movement against the Minister of the Interior, Xhafer Deva”. A few days later, Rexhep Mitrovica would resign, followed by Xhafer Deva. On July 18, 1944, a new government cabinet was formed with Prime Minister Fiqiri Dine. Mehdi Frashëri, as chairman of the High Council of Regency, was not consulted and did not inform the German authorities at all about these developments. Indignant at this action, on July 21, 1944 Neubacher would telephone the German ambassador in Tirana, Schliep, stressing that "without the Wehrmacht there would be no new Albanian state and that with the creation of the New Cabinet the Reich could not be faced with a fait accompli. Without German support, no Albanian government would have the authority, opportunity and ability to exercise its functions". Under these conditions, only about a month later, on August 29, 1944, Fiqiri Dine would resign. After him, on September 6, 1944, a New Cabinet would be created again, with Prime Minister Ibrahim Bey Biçaku. He had no choice but to act as the "liquidator of a bankrupt commercial company" (Verwalters competition). "New Albania" could no longer be governed ... /Gazeta "Panorama"/

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