By: Ismet Azizi
In the first decades of the 20th century, Serbia, with the indirect support of Russia, developed a strategy of expansion towards the Adriatic Sea, through the Sandzak and the northern parts of Albania. This paper analyzes the conception of the Serbian Prime Minister Milovanović [Milovan Milovanović, 1851-1912, Prime Minister of Serbia in 1911-1912] on “Sandzak and the Albanian Question”, which he presented to British diplomats, as well as the reactions of British and Austro-Hungarian politics in the context of the weakening of the Ottoman Empire.
Based on the research of researcher Daut Dauti - in the book Britain and the Albanian Question during the Fall of the Ottoman Empire 1876-1914 - it turns out that the idea of "going out to the warm sea" was an integral part of the Serbian-Russian geopolitical synergy, which simultaneously influenced the change in British orientation towards the Balkans. In that strategy, Sandzak played a key role as a land corridor to the Adriatic and its geopolitical importance went beyond local borders.
At the beginning of the 20th century, Serbia - indirectly supported by Tsarist Russia - displayed open ambitions to reach the Adriatic Sea. Its project, formulated in the doctrine More drawn (1844), envisaged expansion through Kosovo, the Sandzak and the northern Albanian regions, with the aim of connecting to the sea. After the Young Turk Revolution and the further weakening of the Ottoman Empire, these plans took concrete form.
As evidenced by the diplomatic correspondence that Dauti cites, Milovanović, in 1909, had developed a so-called plan for Sandzak and the Albanian problem. He told British Ambassador Cartwright [Fairfax Leighton Cartwright, 1857-1928] that Ottoman power has disappeared in Europe. and that Serbia would have to secure Austria-Hungary's consent to the annexation of “the Sandzak belt and up to the sea, in northern Albania.” This statement represents one of the clearest evidences of Serbian claims over Albanian space and the strategic connection to the Adriatic.
In later talks (1910), Milovanović emphasized that the Balkans were in a “state of fermentation” and that the moment should be used for new territorial divisions, foreseeing the destruction of the Ottoman Empire “from within.” This spirit permeated Serbian policy, which aimed to convince the Great Powers that regional stability could only be achieved through Serbia’s expansion to the Southwest.
As Dauti points out, British Under-Secretary Arthur Nicolson [1849–1928] accepted “Milovanović’s preaching” and even considered the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire as inevitable and beneficial to British interests in Egypt and India. This shows the influence that Serbian ideology had in some Western diplomatic circles, especially in the preparation phase of the Balkan Wars.
This change in British approach - from traditional support of the Sublime Porte to toleration of Serbian and Montenegrin ambitions - constitutes a key moment in the change of balance in the Balkans. During this period, Russia also intensified its efforts to promote the Balkan alliance and direct it against the Ottoman Empire, using Serbia as an instrument of access to the "warm sea".
The Sandzak of New Bazaar was presented in Serbian-Russian projects as a natural route for access to the Adriatic. In addition to its geographical position between Kosovo and Montenegro, it had exceptional importance for the connection with the Albanian coast. This is why, since the end of the 19th century, in Serbian and Russian diplomatic documents, the Sandzak is presented as an “indispensable land strip” for the implementation of the strategy of access to the sea.
Consequently, Milovanović's plans should be seen not as isolated statements, but as part of a broader expansionist vision that would materialize in the Balkan Wars, with the occupation of Kosovo, Sandžak, and then the northern Albanian regions.
Daut Dauti's analysis illuminates the direct connection between the Serbian policy of reaching the "warm sea", which found understanding in British and Russian circles, and the weakening of the international position of Albanians on the eve of 1912.
In this context, Sandzak was not just a peripheral territory of the Ottoman Empire, but a geostrategic node in the clash of Russian-Serbian, Austro-Hungarian, and British interests.
This makes Dauti's analysis a valuable source for understanding the origins of geopolitical claims that would later recur throughout the 20th century - even in Russian foreign policy doctrine after 1990. /Telegraph/
