The Albanian question and the peace of Europe in 1880

The New York Times, May 1880

I think the box is open; the Albanians have declared independence, the entire population has taken up arms to resist the annexation, and the Turkish troops sent to maintain order among the Albanians have gone to the service of the Albanian League.

This is the situation at the moment. It is what every one who had the slightest knowledge of this country had expected to happen one day, from the time of the signing of the treaty of St. Stephen, and if the eruption was delayed until 1880, instead of occurring in 1879, it is simply because the delay served the views of its promoters.

I have simply called attention to the Albanian League, which was born on the eve of the war of 1877. Its nucleus was all the disaffected elements of the Ottoman Empire. Its objective was initially, resistance to the annexation by the Russian Empire. There were uprisings in Macedonia, isolated gang conflicts in Hajduk, sometimes with Turkish soldiers, more often with Russian soldiers. They were never very important, but enough to keep the irritation alive.

In London, the Czar's agents were accused of being agitators; at Petersburg, Lord Beaconsfield was pointed at as the guilty party. But it was taken lightly by the European press, as well as by European diplomats. Both these were profoundly ignorant of everything connected with the aspirations of a very noble race, which has enjoyed a sort of semi-autonomy for centuries.

The Congress of Berlin met and "resolved", to their satisfaction, the whole eastern question. The claims of the Greeks for an extension of the frontiers for which they had never fired a gun or spent a drachma, and those of the rich Rumanian Jews for the right of citizenship, were rejected by the great Waddington, and were supported by his colleagues.

Serbia, which joined the fighting when all danger was past and kicked the dying lion's ass, got a big piece of the Turkish cake, and Montenegro was assured that its territory would be expanded. Good, not bad. On paper, the arrangements looked good, and the High Gate was urged to prepare to evacuate, awaiting new masters.

But the High Gate is never in a hurry, for nothing. Fabian policy had always succeeded in Constantinople, and there was no reason to suppose that it would not succeed again this time, and the Ottomans sat and watched with complacency, convinced that circumstances would show how stupid the Western diplomats were.

Of course, they would send delegates to talk to the Greek delegates. They were sure that these plenipotentiary ambassadors would not agree, and when the quarrel broke out at the Volos conference, they were quite ready to continue the negotiations at Istanbul, where disagreement on every important point was certain, before commissioners to exchange even a word.

The High Gate had no fixed plan for this delay in time. She never has a fixed plan. All she does, at all times, is push back the clock of clarification and truth as much as possible, on the principle that no one knows what tomorrow will bring.

The only thing decided upon was to do nothing until someone else promised to pay the expenses. So much for Turkey, and in so far as the disputed or disputed land has been the province of Turkey, I understand that there is reason to consider the opinion of the Turks.

The Congress has decided to give two regions to the Montenegrins: Plava and Gucia, which, although worthless in any other sense, are of great strategic value. While neither Gucia nor Plava are found on any common map, it is supposed that the diplomats had no idea of ​​their geographical position, and gave them to the sons of the Black Mountains, as they would have given any similar regions, to friends of the all-powerful Russian ambassadors.

When I spoke of the ignorance of the almighty, I was referring to the gentlemen on the banks of the Neva, who are perfectly knowledgeable when it comes to everything in their neighborhood. But so are the Austrians, and there was not a single objection from their representatives to a concession which might afterwards open up trouble for them, if they should ever decide to march as far as Thessalonica. But the Austrians did not listen. Give the Montenegrins Plava and Gucia, said the other "wise men". Why are you late for this strip of land, which produces nothing but thorns and grass?

You will have Bosnia and Herzegovina – with just as many thorns and thistles – and military troops like yours have no reason to fear an army such as Prince Nikita can muster.

Austria consented, because she could not help it, but seeing that her first experiences in the semi-annexed provinces were far from encouraging, she did not attempt to go east of Novi Pazar, and having secured her own communications , finally agreed.

Here the situation starts to get mixed. Was it Austria who wished to prevent the occupation of two provinces which might then become dangerous to her operations, or was it Italy who, enraged at her exclusion from the list of those who had received indemnities in the East, wished a pretext to intervene in the trans-Adriatic? No human being, however wise, can answer these questions.

In any case, when the Montenegrins set out to receive the gifts, the Albanians moved to block their entry. Blood was shed. No matter who won, the invasion was postponed, and Count Corti, the Italian ambassador, proposed a compromise on behalf of the government. The High Gate started Bargaining, but finally agreed. Gucia and Plava were abandoned to their interesting inhabitants, and another piece of land was donated in their place. The agreement was signed and Europe began to cheer, as the pen proved once again mightier than the sword.

The Porte has the best intentions, the ambassador wrote, it wants to comply with the wishes of the Powers. That's what it looked like. She showed great zeal, so great that before the ink of the agreement was well dry, Hafiz Pasha withdrew all his troops, allowing the forces of the League to enter and take up positions, in order that when the Montenegrin forces arrived, they will find the place in the possession not of the seven, but of a legion of devils, who propose to stay there as long as they like.

We are very sorry that our general made such a mistake, Porta replied to a joint telegram of the Powers, which told him that such a thing should not happen, that if there are battles that must be fought against the Albanian insurgents, they must let Turkey and not Montenegro bear the burden. We feel sorry for Pasha's stupidity, we have installed another Pasha in his place. We will do everything we can to convince the rebels to return home peacefully. We will even send reinforcements to our garrisons in the north of Albania, if Europe will pay our expenses, because we do not have any mattresses. But we think it's our duty to remind Europe that we doubt we'll be able to convince our soldiers to attack the Albanians, so we're sorry to say there's not much we can do.

This was the situation in the first part of May. After many rumors about the formal declaration of independence by the Albanians, which has already been confirmed in detail, and also denied, it is impossible to deny that the situation has become extremely delicate. Shkodra is in the hands of the insurgents. We have not heard of excesses of any kind. Everything is done legally, with the aim of ensuring an autonomous existence similar to that of the neighbors in the Balkan Peninsula. /In Albanian from: bota.al/