As world leaders gather for the Munich Security Conference 2026, attention is focused on Europe's efforts to strengthen its defenses. However, cracks in the European arms export system are also emerging.
Despite strict European Union rules, legal loopholes and implementation uncertainties continue to allow weapons to end up in high-risk destinations, writes Euronews.
The EU is working to consolidate its defense industry, increase military spending and improve joint procurement mechanisms. At a time when a more limited military commitment is expected from the United States and the role of American companies in European contracts is being reduced, Brussels is pushing for faster production and closer cooperation between member states.
However, despite the strict regulatory framework, gaps and legal loopholes continue to create opportunities for European weapons to reach high-risk markets and regions.
A defense effort that is reshaping the system
The EU has pledged to continue support for Ukraine, strengthen its defense industry, and increase purchases from European suppliers through new initiatives such as EDIS and the Defense Readiness Omnibus 2025.
These strategies aim to streamline joint production, reduce delays in licensing procedures, and accelerate the delivery of ammunition, military vehicles, and advanced defense systems.
By 2030, the EU aims to source at least 50 percent of its defense purchases from European suppliers. At the same time, the goal is for internal trade in defense equipment to reach 35 percent of the total market.
However, arms export rules at the European level remain fragmented. Each member state makes its own decisions on licensing exports, based on Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which gives countries broad powers in matters of national security.
EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP sets out eight criteria for arms exports, including respect for human rights and the risk of escalation of conflict. Meanwhile, COARM – the EU’s arms export working group – exchanges information and notifications of licence refusals, but has no power to overturn decisions taken by member states.
Legal loopholes and unequal standards
The lack of a central oversight mechanism has created scope for circumvention of the rules. Weapons can circulate relatively easily within the EU, due to more flexible rules for internal trade, and then be exported to third countries through countries with less strict licensing criteria.
"Here we are seeing an erosion of [European] rules that were established 20 or 30 years ago. Now, due to geopolitical pressures, these rules are under pressure," says Frank Slijper, project director at the Dutch peace organization PAX.
Previous cases show how the existing framework can be circumvented. Since 2015, weapons manufactured in Europe and exported to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been widely used in the war in Yemen.
"It's no secret that oil is one of the main drivers of the arms trade. It enables European states to secure access to oil on the one hand and, at the same time, to supply arms to those same oil-exporting countries," Slijper points out.
Post-delivery checks, intended to prevent the misuse or diversion of weapons, have shown limited effectiveness.
“Even if the weapons end up in prohibited or unwanted destinations… if there is any consequence, it is relatively small and short-term, with no major impact on the overall arms export relationship between the two countries,” Slijper explains.
COARM can issue denial notices and monitor export cases, but in the absence of a binding authority at EU level, final decisions remain with national governments. In practice, industrial and strategic interests often take precedence over human rights concerns.
The war in Ukraine has deepened this dilemma. To meet NATO's objectives and support Kiev, the EU and its member states have significantly increased arms production and transfers, in some cases by interpreting the Common Position criteria for exports more flexibly.
"Everything related to arms export control has come under great pressure because the European Union aims to expand its defense industry, and strict rules are often perceived as an obstacle to this progress," Slijper points out.
The internal market dilemma
One of the main objectives of the Defence Readiness Omnibus is to facilitate the transfer of military equipment within the EU. However, this approach could create a new legal loophole.
In cases where equipment is produced through cross-border chains – with components manufactured in several Member States – only the country where final assembly takes place is responsible for export control. Countries supplying parts have no specific obligation to reassess the final destination.
This scheme could allow weapons to bypass stricter national controls, while moving freely within the European single market before being exported to third countries.
Meanwhile, the arms industry exerts considerable influence on this process.
"It is clear that the arms industry has an interest in expanding and generating profits. But at the same time, it is European politicians who support this growth of the defense industry. The voices of the industry are much more powerful than those of civil society, and as a result, human rights concerns often remain in the shadows," Slijper emphasizes.
Call for reform
Experts suggest that the EU could address these weaknesses through a series of reforms. One option is to move from voluntary guidelines to binding rules, which would allow groups like COARM to enforce common standards for arms licensing and even block high-risk exports.
The EU could also strengthen controls on transfers within the Union, to prevent equipment from moving under lighter rules and avoiding stricter national controls.
Another important step is to improve post-delivery monitoring, by imposing stricter measures and enabling the detection of violations at EU level. Publishing detailed data on exports, end-users and refused licenses would make the process more transparent and accountable.
Slijper proposes a simple approach to dealing with industrial and strategic pressures: “If you have difficulty building industrial capacity in Europe, then at least make sure you don’t export outside the European Union. We need all the industrial power for Europe itself – to resupply the weapons we have sent to Ukraine and to achieve greater independence from the United States.”
In practice, legal gaps are evident. Larger Member States may be more flexible in implementing the Common Position, intra-EU transfers often bypass national controls, and post-delivery monitoring remains weak.
COARM has no binding authority to enforce the rules, while civil society concerns on human rights are often overridden by industry lobbying and strategic interests. /Telegraph/
