Vlora before Vlora: The events that prepared the epic of 1920

From: Juffy Pigeon

The international position of Albania after the First World War was as serious as it had been in 1913 in London, after the Balkan wars. Even more serious. Austria-Hungary, supporter of the independent Albanian state, was the loser of the war and did not survive it. Italy, which also had its role in the recognition of Albania's independence, after the war turned into a nightmare for Albanians, as it insisted on the implementation of the Secret Treaty of London 1915, with which the Entente countries had promised Italy the annexation of Vlora of its hinterland, as well as the mandate over the rest of the Albanian territory.

The Italian claim also encouraged the aspiration of Greece and the Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian kingdom (Yugoslavia) to annex the South and the North of Albania. In fact, Belgrade made it clear that in case of secession of the Albanian territories from other countries (meaning Italy and Greece), it would request the annexation of the entire block north of the Drin River, together with Shkodra, as well as the right bank of Black Drin. For its part, Greece considered the end of this war as the appropriate opportunity to realize the annexation of Southern Albania, together with other territories in the Dodecanese, Thrace and Asia Minor.

Greece was persuaded to side with the Entente only in the last months of the war, where it played a negligible role in the victory of the Allied arms. In fact, its losses were calculated at only 4917 people, between killed, wounded and missing, at a time when the number of dead of the warring parties was several million soldiers. Despite this, in the days and months of the Peace Conference, Greece had the traditional support of France, but also the interested support of Great Britain. In the preliminary talks he had with Prime Minister Lloyd George, Venizelos found it easy to seduce him, promising to make all Greek ports and naval bases available to the British fleet. Thus, in January 1919, Albania appeared at the Paris Peace Conference alone, as it had not been at the Congress of Berlin (1878), nor at the Conference of Ambassadors in London (1913), where its destinies were also decided.

The only glimmer of hope coming from the Greats was the 14-point plan on peace in Europe, presented on January 8 before Congress, which heralded a revolution in international relations, until then based on the balance of power between the Greats. Henceforth they had to rely on the right of peoples to decide their own destinies. It is not by chance that the fine politician and diplomat, Ismail Qemali, was among the first to catch the meaning of Wilson's statement in the air. Calling him the "apostle of peace and freedom of peoples", Ismail Qemali wrote enthusiastically that "starting from today, the empire of law comes to life and the era of universal justice begins". But, if he had lived a little longer, the Elder of Vlora would have seen that despite the powerful introduction of the American factor into European politics, the leading role in the Paris Peace Conference was taken by the Englishman Lloyd George and the Frenchman Clemenceau and they were determined to support the claims of their Balkan clients.

As for the Greek ones on South Albania, Jules Cambon, chairman of the Commission for Greek-Albanian affairs, clearly expressed France's position when, already at the first meeting of that Commission, he declared that "the Peace Conference offered the best means to satisfied the early reclamations of the Greek nation, finally completing the work of independence begun a century ago by the Liberal Nations of Europe". For his part, the English representative, Sir Eyre Crowe, unreservedly supported the Greek claims on southern Albania, and when the American representative Day reminded him that that territory was inhabited by an overwhelmingly Albanian population, Crowe, full of cynicism, said: "No spoil the job, the Greek people have great assimilation skills"!

Thus, confident in the support of France and Great Britain, despite the fact that the delegation of the Durrës government at the Paris Conference, with Mihal Turtulli and Mehmet Konica as well as the Italian member of the Commission, Colonel Castoldi, rejected the fabricated arguments and statistics Greek, Venizelos was confident of the triumph of his cause. While the debates on the issue of the Albanian-Greek border continued, he feverishly led the preparations for the takeover of "Vorio-Epirus" from Paris. Thus, as early as February 3, he ordered the Minister of War in Athens to complete the mobilization of the recruits of 1919, to send them to the countries that the Peace Conference would grant to Greece. By his order, the Greek archbishop of Durrës, Jakov, was urgently transferred to Korça, where he had to prepare the conditions for the entry of Greek troops, without encountering the resistance of the population. Formal permission for such a political transfer of the archbishop was immediately issued by the Patriarchate of Istanbul.

On the order of Venizelos, petitions began to be launched from the border areas with Albania, noisy demonstrations organized by the "vorio-Epirote factions", where care was taken to include Albanian citizens of the Muslim faith. Their presence would accredit the thesis defended by Venizelos at the Paris Conference, according to which not only the Christians of South Albania, but also the Muslims wanted a union with Greece. In this frenetic pre-war atmosphere, on March 5, the Italian minister in Athens, Avezzana, informed Rome that Greek army units and paramilitary gangs were gathering in the border centers of Ioannina, Camandas and Konica, which would penetrate into Albanian territory to organized an uprising to declare the "autonomy of Vorio-Epirus", according to the scenario experimented in 1914.

In tune with these developments, in Albania, with encouragement and support from abroad, the Esadist movement was revived. Thus, the situation both in the Paris Conference and in Albania was becoming more and more critical. Under these conditions, the Durrës government and its delegation in Paris were convinced that the only way to save the country was to accept a protectorate, or temporary "guardianship" of a great power, under which it would be saved at least the land mass of London Albania.

Encouraged by President Wilson's statements, Mehmet Konica, Mihal Turtulli and Mithad Frashëri defended the idea that this guardian power should be the USA, which had no colonial or imperialist interests over Albania. The American guardianship option was also strongly supported by the "Vatra" Federation and the "National Political Party" in the USA, as well as by other patriotic associations in Switzerland, Romania, Turkey, etc. However, the majority of the Durrës government and the delegation, starting with Prime Minister Turhan Pasha, also the head of the Albanian delegation in Paris, was leaning towards the Italian protectorate.

Although he accepted the superiority of an American protectorate, the spokesman of this group, Mustafa Kruja, reasoned that "relations between states are not built on the basis of wishes, but on the basis of interests". And, unfortunately, he said, the USA has no interests in Albania and the Balkans, while Italy had the Balkan and Albanian policy as one of the fundamental pillars of its foreign policy. Of course, he also accepted that the connection with Italy could turn into an alliance "against common enemies", but it also carried the risk that Italy would adopt an imperialist-colonial approach to Albania. For Turtulli and others, this approach was something certain from the moment that Italy insisted on the implementation of the secret Treaty of London, which gave Italy Vlora with its surroundings as well as the protectorate over Central Albania, while those of the north and south were foreseen to be given to Serbia and Greece. In this way, they reasoned, "the Italian government is not only unable to protect and unite all Albanians in a single state, but on the contrary, with its intention to transform Vlora and its hinterland into an Italian land , has become the main cause of our national destruction".

In fact, the Peace Conference brought bitter disappointments to the members of the Albanian delegation, both supporters of an "Italian solution" and supporters of the "American solution". The first ones waited in vain for the Italians to respond to the call of the government of Durrës and publicly declare in defense of the territorial integrity of Albania. Not only did they not do this, but in July 1919, Minister Tittoni signed a secret agreement with Greek Prime Minister Venizelos, by which Italy recognized the annexation of Korça and Gjirokastra to Greece. The agreement, which the Greeks could not bear to keep secret, wiped out any hope of Italian support for Albanian national interests and finally destroyed the authority of the pro-Italian government of Durrës.

For their part, even the supporters of a preferential relationship and an American mandate over Albania were seriously shocked when in April 1919 President Wilson joined the Anglo-French proposal to recognize Italy's sovereignty over Vlora. As Wilson himself would later claim, he was bombarded by a whole wave of protests from the representatives of Albanian organizations. Even the "silent" Turhan Pasha protested next to President Wilson. "Our surprise was all the greater and excruciating", it was said in his letter, "given that the small Albanian people had based all their hope on the high principles of Your Excellency, so that the states are not divided without take into account the national rights of the peoples who live in them". However, even in this first phase, which can be called a phase of approval with the conference, the American delegation prevented Albania's borders from being established quickly according to the agreements reached in advance between Venizelos and Prime Ministers Lloyd George and Clemenceau. As early as February 12, the US representative, Day, declared that his country would not accept the borders proposed by Venizelos as long as they did not correspond to ethnic borders", and that "nothing should be given to Greece, without first studying the matter in depth". This attitude, at least, caused the problem to remain on stand-by for months, until the circumstances changed in favor of the Albanian issue.

The first major event that changed the course of events was the convocation of the Congress of Lushnja, on January 21, 1920, and the creation of a national government, which, regardless of what was being cooked up in Paris, decided to turn to its own people in defense of independence and territorial integrity. The decision to move the solution of the Albanian issue from Paris to Albania, expelling the foreign troops and uniting the cities and provinces coveted by the neighbors with the government of Tirana, was a unanimous decision of the Congress of Lushnja and the government that emerged from it. On that basis, a bold national project was built for the restoration of the country's independence and territorial integrity using, as an ultima ratio, even force. The call of the government found a massive echo among the people. At the beginning of 1920, the situation was so radicalized that even an ultraconservative, like Syrja Bej Vlora, with the language of a hardened socialist, said that the salvation of Albania would come either from a victory for the Italian socialists in the elections of that year, which according to him, it would separate Italy from the imperialist policy towards Albania, or from a general uprising of the Albanian people against the Italian invaders, which would also remove the risk of Greek-Yugoslav annexations.

Meanwhile, in a coincidental synchronicity with the Congress of Lushnja, on January 21, 1920, the attitude of the US government marked a strong turn. By means of a short and blunt memorandum, she rejected the last Anglo-French project, that of January, which after Italy and Greece also satisfied the appetite of Yugoslavia, promising it Northern Albania. "We - declared Wilson, - cannot give our consent to an arrangement which, either in the terms of the provisions or in the methods used to impose it, constitutes an absolute denial of the principles for which America entered the war". Lloyd George and Clemenceau understood that this time the American President was not joking and by means of a "conciliatory" letter they hurried to assure him that no decision would be made without the approval of the USA and that the interests of the Albanian people would be taken into account. also, in consideration of them. Wilson replied to this letter on 25 February.

"The President - it was said there - notes with pleasure that the British and French governments will not neglect the future interests and well-being of the Albanian people. The American government understands very well that the division of Albania into three parts, as provided for by the Anglo-French agreement, could be accepted with all pleasure by the Yugoslav government, but it is decidedly against the Albanian people being injured in order to do good to Yugoslavia, just as he is against the Yugoslav people being hurt to do Italy a favor". "Albanian affairs - underlined President Wilson - in a last note of March 6, 1920 - should not be included in the discussion that is proposed between Italy and Yugoslavia, and the President is forced to declare once again that he would not approve any plan that would give him Yugoslavia a territorial compensation in the northern part of Albania, instead of something that can be separated elsewhere".

This determined and rather harsh intervention by President Wilson ended the series of dirty deals that were cooked up on the sidelines of the Peace Conference on Albania's back. Albania's fate was no longer played in Paris, but in Albania. Here the patriotic atmosphere was on, and thanks to a coordination and close cooperation between the government of Sulejman Delvina, volunteer forces, patriotic squads, the population and municipal bodies of the cities, Gjirokastra, Durrësi, Delvina, Saranda, Leskovik, Fieri and Shkodra with the whole province, announced the union with the government of Tirana, which placed its army and administration there. In May 1920, the year-long war of the patriotic forces of Korça and its surroundings ended, uniting this symbolic city with the government of Tirana. The extraordinary popular mobilization made it fail here as well, just like in Shkodër, the replacement of the French troops with the troops of the Greek army. We are at the end of May. After a few days, the last phase of another epic that also started a year ago, and which returned the city of Flag to the Albanian state reborn by the work and heroism of its sons, would begin.