The schism between Saudi Arabia and the Emirates could make Trump's job even more difficult

By: Daniel R. DePetris / Newsweek
Translation: Telegrafi.com

The Middle East has enough problems as it is.

The war in Gaza may have been temporarily suspended, but the Trump administration’s effort to build an international coalition to disarm Hamas means that President Trump’s 20-point peace plan is, at best, fragile. Iran’s nuclear and missile programs suffered setbacks after the 12-day war in June, but Tehran’s efforts to rebuild its military capacity have prompted Trump to threaten another strike. Meanwhile, Syria remains in a difficult period of transition, in which the new government led by former al-Qaeda commander Ahmed al-Sharaa is struggling to consolidate its authority.

Now we can add to the mix a crisis in the Persian Gulf, one that could further complicate the Trump administration's broader diplomatic agenda in the region. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, two of Washington's closest partners in the Middle East, are already at odds with each other in Yemen, a constantly troubled country that has been in a state of civil war for the past decade.

Saudi Arabia and the Emirates are usually described as strategic partners, if not allies.

This is not entirely untrue; the two Gulf powers cooperate on a range of security issues. Both countries want Syria’s new government to succeed and were quick to provide political and economic support to Sharaan after his forces overthrew the Assad regime. Both are historically suspicious of Iran’s intentions. Both the Saudis and the Emiratis are happy to have American troops on their soil. And both would like to see Hezbollah in Lebanon destroyed.

However, the interests of the two countries are not identical. As their economies and geopolitical influence have grown, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman [MBS], and the Emirati president, Mohammed Bin Zayed [MBZ], have sought to convert this capital into power. For MBS, this is about ensuring political stability in the region so that the kingdom has time to modernize its economy. MBZ, on the other hand, seems to have a different perception of how power should be exercised. In Sudan, for example, the Emirates is the main foreign backer of the Rapid Support Forces, a militia that has helped plunge this large African country into one of the world’s worst civil wars. The Saudis, by contrast, are on the other side of this conflict and have been more involved in diplomatic solutions.

Yemen, however, is where Saudi and Emirati interests clash most violently. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were once the main organizers of a military coalition aimed at forcibly overthrowing the Iran-backed Houthi Movement. But as time passed and the stalemate in the war wore on, the Emirates decided to withdraw, withdrew most of its forces from the country in 2019, and have since focused on establishing credible proxies in the south of the country. The Saudis have also withdrawn militarily, but still see Yemen’s stability as inseparable from their interests.

The problem is that Yemen’s internationally recognized government spends as much time fighting itself as it does the Houthis. The Presidential Leadership Council, which was supposed to unite anti-Houthi elements into a unified administration, is in reality a patchwork of competing interests; the Saudis have their favorites and the Emiratis have theirs. Incidentally, the Emirati favorite, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), is the most powerful force on the ground and has lost patience with the normal process. The STC, which has the long-term goal of creating an independent state in southern Yemen, has spent the past week seizing territory, including areas near Saudi Arabia’s southern border.

The Saudis reacted swiftly. On Tuesday, December 30, Riyadh launched airstrikes against a convoy it said was supplying the STC with weapons from the Emirates. The Saudi Foreign Ministry also issued a statement effectively blaming the Emirates for destabilizing Yemen. On January 2, more Saudi airstrikes hit STC positions, and Saudi-backed Yemeni forces launched an operation to retake territory. The Emirates have tried to strike a balance between expressing objections, defending their interests, and announcing the withdrawal of all their forces. Whether MBS will see these announcements as an opportunity for de-escalation remains to be seen.

How will this Gulf rift affect Trump’s regional initiatives? In the short term, it probably won’t have any impact. The Saudi-Emirati clash is largely confined to Yemen, a country the Trump administration sees with interest only as long as the Houthi movement continues to attack civilian tankers in the Red Sea. Houthi attacks have subsided recently. The White House is unlikely to spend much political capital on Yemen, despite the recent fighting.

However, if Riyadh and Abu Dhabi cannot reach a compromise on how Yemen should be governed, how the anti-Houthi militias should be structured, and what security arrangements should be implemented along Yemen’s porous border, the rivalry could spill over into other areas of policy. Rebuilding Gaza could become even more complicated if the Saudis and Emiratis start working in opposite directions. The same goes for Syria, where consolidating the new state could become impossible if MBS and MBZ start to see the Levant as an arena of rivalry rather than cooperation.