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In mid-January 2026, analysts reported a significant increase in far-right propaganda linked to Russia circulating in Telegram in Serbia. Dozens of interconnected channels amplified the messages of the International Sovereign League and other extremist networks, reaching hundreds of thousands of followers. These channels are not isolated echo chambers. Ultranationalist groups in Serbia re-distribute coordinated content on immigration, traditionalism, and opposition to liberal norms, embedding them deeply in the discourse online narratives aligned with Moscow. The expansion of these networks highlights how digital platforms have become central vectors of foreign influence in the Western Balkans, shaping public opinion and political dynamics, rather than simply reflecting them.

mesh online are just one layer of a broader ecosystem. Across the Western Balkans, far-right groups march in the streets, Orthodox priests present geopolitical allegiance as a moral obligation, while benevolent politicians seek Moscow’s “blessing” to challenge Western norms by building a coordinated strategy that uses digital, religious, and political levers of influence.

The weight of this dynamic is clear for the Balkans and the West. Russian influence is no longer abstract; it exploits historical wounds, social conservatism, and fragile institutions to impose an illiberal model of governance. Through extremist organizations, religious networks, and sympathetic political elites, Moscow is exporting the very blueprint of its authoritarian system: centralized authority, limited pluralism, and the fusion of cultural and political power in a region still struggling to achieve democratic consolidation. Understanding this dynamic is essential for protecting democratic norms and the EU integration process in a region under active ideological contestation.

In the Western Balkans today, Russia’s influence is not a distant abstraction. Rather, it is a tangible force that shapes elections, polarizes societies, and embeds itself within extremist movements that claim cultural affinity and political mission. From Belgrade to Banja Luka to Skopje, Moscow’s strategy has evolved into a multi-layered campaign that combines cultural identity, Orthodox affiliation, extremist networks, and influence operations. It is a plan to export a model of governance rooted in centralized authority and resistance to the norms of liberal democracy.

The contours of this influence became starkly clear in September 2025, when neo-Nazi and far-right groups from across Europe gathered in St. Petersburg under the auspices of the Russian Orthodox Church to establish the International Sovereign League. Italy’s Forza Nuova, Greece’s Golden Dawn, and Serbian ultranationalist groups such as the People’s Guard and Serbian Action participated alongside the oligarch-ideologist Konstantin Malofeev and the Russian nationalist thinker Aleksandr Dugin. The League’s mission, “to defend white Christian values” against Western decadence, illustrated how Kremlin-linked networks provide platforms for extremist ideologies, clothed in religious legitimacy. As noted United24 Media, “far-right groups were given moral approval by the Church, effectively transforming radical political agendas into a form of spiritual/religious obligation.”

Far from being isolated, these networks benefit from allies and facilitators within the European Union, who give them legitimacy and space for the circulation of ideas. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has played a particularly facilitating role in this ecosystem. He organizes gatherings, such as the 2023 Demographic Forum in Budapest, that attract regional far-right actors, ultranationalist politicians, and ideologues sympathetic to a socially conservative worldview. By providing high-profile platforms and soft diplomatic cover, Orbán has strengthened ties between Western Balkan extremists and their European counterparts, effectively normalizing a socially conservative and authoritarian model of governance that mirrors that of Russia.

This development has broader implications. The rise of far-right movements across Europe, which openly admire or imitate the Russian political model, signals to the region that illiberalism is a viable and electorally successful template. This encourages local actors to reject EU norms on pluralism, civil liberties, and minority rights, making it much easier for the Kremlin to operationalize influence operations in states that already face weak institutions and political fragmentation.

These dynamics are not merely symbolic. Across the Western Balkans, extremist and pro-Russian currents have transformed ideological proximity into concrete political influence, shaping local elections and national policy debates.

These transnational extremist currents have found fertile ground in regional politics. In North Macedonia’s 2025 local elections, parties like United Macedonia are campaigning against EU and NATO integration, invoking sovereignty and cultural preservation, while appealing to businessmen and ideological networks aligned with Moscow. In Serbia, the government’s refusal to impose sanctions on Russia after the war in Ukraine has strengthened domestic political coalitions sympathetic to the Kremlin’s narratives. Ultranationalist groups like the Serbian party Betimtarës have gained parliamentary representation and are now cooperating with the ruling Serbian Progressive Party, normalizing an anti-Western platform and promoting legislation that restricts civil society.

Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina provides another strong example. Milorad Dodik, the former president of Republika Srpska, has repeatedly traveled to Moscow to reaffirm pro-Russian positions, while obstructing state-level reforms and promoting secessionist rhetoric. In February 2025, Dodik’s government passed a “law on foreign agents,” modeled directly on Russian legislation, to restrict independent media and nongovernmental organizations, institutionalizing a tactic that Moscow has used domestically to suppress dissent and social dissent.

Beyond legislation, Russian influence in the Balkans flourishes in civic and cultural life. Serbia experienced some of the largest protests in decades in 2025, with hundreds of thousands of citizens demanding accountability for corruption and government failures. Rather than address the grievances, authorities labeled these protests as “color revolutions” orchestrated by foreign powers—a narrative taken directly from Russian information operations. Russian and state-affiliated Serbian media amplified this propaganda, portraying civic engagement as an existential threat manipulated by Brussels or Washington.

Religious institutions have emerged as among the most effective carriers of pro-Kremlin narratives. The Serbian Orthodox Church, deeply embedded in political life, acts as a powerful amplifier of pro-Russian sentiment, framing geopolitical elections as cultural battles and positioning Moscow as the defender of Orthodox civilization. As an article in New Union Post, “religious authority in the Balkans is not symbolic. It mobilizes voters, legitimizes political positions, and amplifies narratives that align with Russian strategic interests.” Extremist leaders exploit this religious platform to normalize ultranationalist and anti-Western rhetoric, presenting it as a defense of tradition, not ideology.

Even outside Orthodox networks, Moscow’s strategy adapts to other sociopolitical contexts. Research shows that pro-Russian actors have occasionally collaborated with Islamic organizations in the Balkans, promoting narratives of resistance to Western cultural imperialism. The flexibility of these networks underscores Moscow’s focus not simply on ideology, but on building strategic alliances across a wide range of social settings.

A clear model of governance ties these interventions together. Russia exports a combination of centralized authority, limited pluralism, and cultural traditionalism, demonstrating how authoritarian power can be accompanied by social control framed as moral obligation. Where institutions are weak, civil society limited, and economic frustration high, this model finds fertile ground. It normalizes the idea that deviation from norms aligned with Moscow threatens not only political order but also cultural survival.

European decision-makers have recognized these dynamics. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen condemned “Russia’s hybrid attacks aimed at destabilizing democracies in the Western Balkans,” stressing the importance of strengthening democratic institutions and independent media to resist external interference. Regional leaders echo these concerns, warning that Moscow’s continued influence could jeopardize peace, democratic progress, and the credibility of EU accession processes.

Russia's influence in the Western Balkans reflects a deliberate and adaptive strategy, integrating extremist organizations, religious authority, and legislative instruments into a coherent model of political influence. Rather than simply exporting ideology, Moscow promotes a system of governance characterized by centralized authority, limited pluralism, and cultural traditionalism.

As these practices become institutionalized through elections, media regulation, and restrictions on civil society, they reshape political norms and expectations in the region. The result is not episodic interventions, but the gradual normalization of illiberal governance in societies already marked by institutional fragility and unresolved identity conflicts. This trajectory suggests that Russia’s role in the Balkans will remain an enduring factor in shaping the region’s political evolution.

(The author served as Chief of Staff to the President of Kosovo (2021-2023) and holds a PhD in Contemporary European Studies from the University of Sussex. This article was originally published by the Jamestown Foundation in English)

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