Israel cannot continue to win this way.

By: Mairav ​​Zonszein, senior Israel analyst at the International Crisis Group / The New York Times
Translation: Telegrafi.com

Following the Israeli attack on Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, on September 9, an anonymous Israeli official told Axiosthat Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was "so enamored with the role of regional tycoon that no one can predict his next move."

Indeed, over the past two years, Israel has demonstrated both its unparalleled intelligence capabilities and its willingness to strike anywhere in the region—including, in the case of Qatar, a country that is not an enemy state, that acts as a mediator, and that is also an ally of Israel’s biggest supporter [the United States]. Moreover, Israel was willing to do so at a time when negotiations were underway to end the war in Gaza and return Israeli hostages home.

Since the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, Israel appears to have focused on restoring its security in the region—both through rebuilding its ability to deter enemies and dismantle their military capabilities, and through a willingness to engage in permanent war—a state of affairs that has transformed Israeli society and the dynamics of power in the Middle East. Israel has acted boldly, has been unpredictable, and, until its recent ceasefire proposal, has been virtually unstoppable. In most cases, it has used force without any sustained diplomacy. The clearest example of this is, of course, Israel’s destruction of Gaza, rendering the territory largely uninhabitable, as several members of the cabinet have openly acknowledged.

Donald Trump's proposal last month to end the war - which is essentially not a peace plan but an ultimatum to Hamas - has the potential to end the bloodshed and destruction in Gaza, free the hostages and give all those on the ground a chance to begin healing. But its success depends on a long political commitment and sustained American pressure on Israel and Hamas.

Mr. Netanyahu has hailed Trump’s plan as a victory. However, the security gains his country has achieved are fragile or debatable, and Israel’s international isolation could deepen. Changing Israel’s wartime character is not necessarily part of the equation.

All of this should worry Israelis. Even if the war ends, there will come a profound moment of reflection on society's collective responsibility for years of mass killing and displacement. Palestinians desperately need this war to end. But so do Israelis.

The weaknesses of Israel’s security doctrine have become increasingly apparent. Ultimately, it was the failed attack on Doha – a blow to the heart of the Gulf, where Israel has benefited from its continued protection of the Abraham Accords – that backfired, prompting concerted pressure on Mr Netanyahu to comply with Mr Trump’s demand to end the war. The latest push by Netanyahu’s coalition into Gaza City occurred not only against the will of some in the Israeli military and most Israelis, but also helped to forge a global consensus that Israel’s campaign in Gaza amounts to genocide. Israel’s diplomatic isolation – on full display at the United Nations last month, as major Western powers recognised the State of Palestine and Mr Netanyahu delivered a speech to a nearly empty hall – was making the country look increasingly like a self-destructive and irrational actor, rather than the regional hegemon it aspired to be.

Israel’s strategy has yielded some tactical victories. In Gaza, Israel has significantly damaged Hamas’s military strength. Its operations in Lebanon have dealt a decisive blow to Hezbollah and — probably unintentionally — contributed to the downfall of another enemy, President Bashar al-Assad of Syria. While Israel’s 12-day war in Iran fell short of Mr. Netanyahu’s goals of eliminating Tehran’s nuclear program and significantly weakening the regime, it has nonetheless damaged Iran’s offensive and defensive capabilities and, perhaps most of all, has shown that Israel and the United States are not afraid to strike deep inside the country.

But in each case, instead of building on these gains and moving toward peace as a practical solution, Israel has chosen to double down on the path of war—even when it has been to the detriment of its own interests. As U.S. envoy Tom Barrack recently noted, Hezbollah has “zero” incentive to give up its remaining arsenal when “Israel is attacking everyone.” When the U.S.-brokered ceasefire in Gaza went into effect earlier this year, Israel could have seized the opportunity to return the hostages and achieve its own goals of a better regional security picture. Instead, it broke the ceasefire and continued to cause mass starvation among Palestinians in Gaza.

In Syria, after the fall of Mr. al-Assad, Israel launched strikes to disable the country’s military capabilities and destroy suspected chemical weapons sites. Israeli soldiers took up positions inside Syrian territory, and the Israeli army prevented the new government from establishing control over Druze areas. Even if these were temporary actions in the service of Israeli security, this does not explain why, amid reports that Israel and Syria were close to reaching a security agreement, Defense Minister Israel Katz seemed to decide to mock his opponents by posting a photo of himself alongside Israeli soldiers — in an area that Israel had occupied — and writing: “We are not leaving Mount Hermon.”

Usually, a victory can be understood as a closing point, or at least a decisive conclusion that requires no further action. But, in Israel, victory seems to bring only more rounds of war. Israel is not a winner, but a perpetual warrior.

Last month, Mr. Netanyahu delivered what has come to be known as his “super-Sparta” speech. Comparing the country to the ancient cities of Athens and Sparta, Mr. Netanyahu acknowledged that Israel was becoming increasingly isolated and that its economy and military would need to become more self-sufficient. This was no slip of the tongue: Just as he had convinced Israelis to get used to perpetual war, he also worked to normalize the country’s isolation.

It has become a political axiom in Israel that Mr. Netanyahu’s only strategy is political survival, that he will do anything to stay in power; that Israel’s perpetual war has been simply a form of megalomania. But that is not the whole story.

It is true that most of the Israeli public and military have been demanding a deal to end the war for months. But none of the actions Israel has taken over the past two years would have been possible without a ready army, media, and society—including tens of thousands of reservists following orders. It is not just that many Israelis have no problem with the idea of ​​expelling Palestinians from Gaza, or that they are opposed to Palestinian self-determination and a two-state solution. Essentially, many Israelis—whether out of conviction, fear, or submission to those in power—seem to believe that the path to security is to maintain dominance and crush anyone who stands in the way.

Mr. Trump, despite his boasting and personal interests, has attempted to change this equation.

Until the announcement of new peace talks, which prompted the Israeli military to declare that it was moving to a defensive posture in Gaza despite the ongoing airstrikes, none of the mounting diplomatic, economic, or cultural pressures had affected Israeli policy, nor had they had any significant impact on the daily lives of the people. At the same time, the ceasefire, although long overdue, is likely to ease international pressure on Israel to change its policies—not just in Gaza, but toward Palestinians in general. And, for now, even if a ceasefire in Gaza is achieved, Israel will continue to maintain occupied territories in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, as well as a military presence in Lebanon and Syria, beyond the already occupied and annexed Golan Heights.

Israelis will only know true security when it is felt by everyone around them - not by one place alone. /Telegraph