The European Union is working to strengthen its arms industry, increase defense spending, and improve joint procurement.
As it prepares for less American military involvement and aims to limit the roles of American companies in contracts, Brussels is encouraging faster production and closer cooperation.
However, even with strict rules, loopholes and ambiguities still allow weapons to reach high-risk destinations, the Telegraph reports.
A push for protection that reshapes the system
The EU has pledged to support Ukraine, strengthen its defense industry, and purchase more equipment from European sources through new plans such as EDIS and the Defense Readiness Omnibus 2025.
These strategies aim to streamline joint production, reduce licensing delays, and accelerate the delivery of advanced munitions, vehicles, and systems.
By 2030, the EU wants at least half of its defense purchases to come from European suppliers and increase internal defense trade to 35% of the market.
Europe's arms export rules are not unified. Each country makes its own licensing decisions under Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.
EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP sets out eight criteria, including human rights and the risk of conflict. COARM, the EU arms export group, shares information and denial notifications, but cannot overturn national decisions.
Unequal scales and standards
Since there is no central control, loopholes have emerged. Weapons can easily move within the EU under relaxed rules and then be sent to other countries with less stringent licensing requirements.
"I think there we see an erosion of [European] rules that were already established 20, 30 years ago. Now, because of geopolitical pressures, these rules are under pressure," says Frank Slijper, project leader at the Dutch peace organization PAX.
Past examples show how the rules can be circumvented. Since 2015, European weapons sent to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been widely used in the war in Yemen.
"It's no secret that oil is one of the main drivers of the arms trade. It enables European states to have access to oil on the one hand and to supply weapons to the same oil-supplying countries on the other," notes Slijper.
Post-delivery checks, intended to prevent misuse of weapons, have little effect.
"Even if the weapons end up in prohibited or unwanted destinations, if there are any consequences, they are relatively small, for a short time, and do not have a major effect on the overall arms export relationship between these two countries," Slijper explains.
COARM can send denial notices and track exports, but without a binding EU authority, national governments often prioritize industrial and strategic interests over human rights rules.
The war in Ukraine has exacerbated the problem. To meet NATO's goals and support Kiev, the EU and its members have increased production and transfers, sometimes interpreting the rules of the Common Position more loosely.
"Everything related to arms export control has been put under great pressure because of the European Union's desire to grow its own arms industry, and then two strict rules are hindering progress," says Slijper.
The internal market dilemma
One of the main goals of the Defence Readiness Omnibus is to facilitate the transfer of arms within the EU, but this could create a legal loophole.
If equipment is manufactured in several countries, only the country where it is assembled would have to control it, not the countries that supply the parts. This could allow weapons to evade stricter national controls as they move across Europe.
The arms industry also exerts considerable influence.
"It is clear that the arms industry has an interest in growing and making a profit, but at the same time, it is European politicians who support this growth of the European arms industry; those voices from the arms industry are so much louder than the voices from civil society that in fact these human rights concerns are overshadowed, unfortunately," Slijper stressed.
Call for reform
Experts say the EU could address these problems with some reforms. It could move from voluntary guidelines to binding rules, so that groups like COARM could enforce common licensing standards or block high-risk exports.
It could tighten controls on transfers within the EU, to stop equipment moving under weaker rules and circumvent stricter national controls.
The EU could also strengthen post-surrender monitoring by adding tougher penalties and possible enforcement at the EU level.
Publishing detailed data on exports, end users, and denied licenses would also make the process more transparent and accountable.
Slijper offers a simple way to deal with industrial and strategic pressures: "If you have difficulty [building industrial capacity for Europe], then at least make sure you don't export outside the European Union. We need all the industrial power for Europe itself to replenish the stock of weapons that we supplied to Ukraine, but also to become much more independent of the United States."
In practice, gaps are clear. Large member states can be less strict with the common position, intra-EU transfers can evade national controls, and post-delivery monitoring is weak.
COARM also cannot enforce the rules. Meanwhile, concerns from civil society about human rights are often sidelined by industry lobbying and strategic interests. /Telegraph/
