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Fadil Hoxha, April 1994: Tito and Kardeli said: What do you need a republic!? Beware of Serbia...!

Fadil Hoxha, April 1994: Tito and Kardeli said: What do you need a republic!? Beware of Serbia...!

Fadil Hoxha, in the last years of his life, in conversations with friends, colleagues, but also with journalists, has testified about the newest history of Kosovo. This time, Telegrafi brings you the full text of the conversation between historian Agim Zogaj and Fadil Hoxha, held in April 1994, at his home. This interview was published in the festive issue of the Albanian Political Weekly - "Zëri", for the New Year 2003 (December 2002). It was published then with the authorization of his wife, now deceased, Vahide Hoxha. In this testimony of Fadil Hoxha, there are data that can cause controversy and curiosity, not only among historians and publicists. During this conversation, he publicly admitted for the first time that he always saw the solution of the Kosovo issue only in the union with Albania.

* Serbia constantly opposed the development of Kosovo, its constitutional construction and in particular the tendencies for as much independence as possible from the Serbian rule, namely for the definitive liberation from that rule. Which Serbian political personalities of that time were the most strict opponents in this plan?

DRAZHA MARKOVIQI, THE DETERMINED ENEMY OF THE ALBANIANS

Hoxha: First of all, I have to say that not only Serbia, but also others in the former Yugoslavia opposed our aspiration and goal for independence and independence of Kosovo from Serbia. Of the politicians of that time, in any case, Drazha Markovic (Dragoslavi, aunt of Mira Markovic, the wife of Slobodan Milosevic - vj Telegrafi), was the key Serbian personality, who at all costs and with Serbian aggressiveness, even openly, opposed our way . He was therefore the harshest in the attacks against Kosovo and its leadership.


Drazha Markovici was a Serbian politician who had no political authority in Serbia, so he tried to build a political career on the attacks he made against Kosovo. So, he used Kosovo for his careerist goals, which in essence corresponded to the nationalist current in Serbia and generally to the Serbian anti-Albanian line.

We were constantly in political conflicts with Drazha Markovic, especially after 1981. Meanwhile, I remember our serious conflict with Drazha regarding the "Blue Book" (1976-1997) which the Serbian leadership led by Drazha Markovic had prepared. in secret together with the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Serbia. Drazha Markovici was the organizer, ideologue and executor of that anti-Albanian project against Kosovo.

With the "Blue Book", the Serbian leadership aimed to reopen the discussions on the level of the former Yugoslav federation about the removal of the autonomy of Kosovo, which was ensured by the Constitution of 1974. Among the politicians of that time, Veselin Gjuranović from Montenegro, was more correct to the Kosovo issue. He and Xhemajl Bijedić (who drowned in a suspicious air accident on January 18, 1977 - according to Telegraph), also, until he suffered in the air accident, constantly had orders from Tito to take care of the economic development of Kosovo. We should also mention the correct attitude of the Malaysian Velko Vlahović, in the context of the time.

* However, how did it happen that Eduard Kardeli, the second political person in the former Yugoslavia, in some cases sided with Serbia, to the detriment of the fair and legitimate interests of Kosovo and generally of the Albanian people in the former Yugoslavia?

KARDELI UNDER SERBIAN INFLUENCE

Hoxha: Yes, your conclusion is that regarding the "Blue Book", Kardeli (Tito's right-hand man - vj Telegrafit) had initially supported the then Serbian leadership and their Serb-wide, hegemonic claims towards Kosovo, with which it was claimed to be removed that bit of autonomy of Kosovo secured by the Constitution of 1974. As soon as we found out, completely by chance, about the "Blue Book" and the Serbian claims with that document, which was in fact illegal and secretly prepared, we requested a meeting with Kardeli.

As the leadership of Kosovo, where, as far as I know, Mahmut Bakalli and Xhavit Nimani were, we told Kardel that we are outraged by this form of pressure and expansionist Serbian goals towards Kosovo. Kardelit. Also, we informed him that the way that document was prepared, that is, in an extraordinary conspiracy, is very indicative. In fact, in that meeting we clearly presented our positions as the then leadership of Kosovo.

Meanwhile, in Belgrade, we also requested an urgent meeting with the then Serbian leadership, which was led by Drazha Marković, a permanent political opponent of Kosovo. However, from the first conversation with the Serbian leadership, we understood that they were very emboldened by the support of Kardel and it seemed that they did not even consider our opposition, being convinced that the "Blue Book" will still pass and it will be suppressed the autonomy of Kosovo.

Eduard Kardeli at that time, i.e. the year 1976-1977, was affected by the deadly disease and had begun to weaken physically. After the talks with the Serbian leadership, we again asked for a meeting with Kardel, who, being very healthy, when we told him that the Serbian leadership is calling you, told us: "This is fiction"!

After these very tough conversations in Belgrade, sometimes with Kardel and sometimes with the Serbian leadership, we invited Kardel to visit Kosovo and calmly talk about the complicated problems in the Kosovo-Serbia relationship. Kardeli came to Kosovo in 1977 and we first talked with him in Pristina and then in Brezovica. The talks were very difficult, while Kardeli did not allow the recording of the talks, almost hidden in Brezovica. During the talks in Brezovica, but also beforehand in Pristina, we managed to convince Kardel that Serbia's demands for revision of the 1974 Constitution of Kosovo are very dangerous and absolutely unacceptable for the people of Kosovo.

I can say that it was not easy to convince Kardel in our positions, because he was under permanent Serbian influence and was never ready to break with Serbia for reasons of Kosovo.

* Did Tito know about the behind-the-scenes of the "Blue Book"?

TITO KNEW ABOUT THE PURPOSES OF THE "BLUE BOOK"

Hoxha: Yes, I can competently say that Tito had information about Serbia's claims against Kosovo, that is, about Serbian intentions to suppress Kosovo's autonomy through the "Blue Book" and to impose an even stricter supervision on developments in Kosovo. In fact, we as the then leadership of Kosovo made a mistake because we did not go public in unmasking the Serbian tendencies, not only in relation to the Serbian demands and goals that came out of the "Blue Book". In this context, I believe that if we had known that the events of 1981 would happen and if we had foreseen the political and military-police offensive of Serbia against Kosovo, it would certainly have been better for Kosovo to have openly opposed the trend of Belgrade.

However, at that time, even as the leadership of Kosovo, we thought not to confront Serbia. In fact, as far as the issue of the "Blue Book" and the disputes that came out of that Serbian claim, there was a kind of silent agreement, not publicly announced, that in relation to those disputes and internal political conflicts, we would not come out in the opinion of either Kosovo, neither Serbia nor former Yugoslavia.

Of course, thanks to our consistency and unwavering stance in opposing the "Blue Book" and its goals, the then Serbian leadership withdrew from that goal, even Drazha Markovic himself, the main exponent of Serbia's hegemonic goals towards Kosovo, with political cynicism declared: "Yes, the "Blue Book" was only a working material"!?

We, as the leadership of Kosovo, were self-sufficient because Serbia once again withdrew from its expansionist goals towards Kosovo, for which I say that we forced the Serbian leadership to do so.

* Do you agree that the memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts of 1985 was and is a continuation of the "Blue Book" and the program goals noted in it and inspired by the traditionally hegemonic Serbian policy towards the Albanian issue?

"BLUE BOOK", THE CONTINUATION OF "THE NATURE", THE PREDECESSOR OF MILOSEVIC

Hoxha: The "Blue Book" has its bases in Serbia's hegemonic policy towards Kosovo and that from Ilia Garasanin's "Nacertania" (1844, the basis of Serbian and anti-Albanian ideology), and onward, that is, to the Milosevician policy. In fact, I think that Serbia has been waiting for something to happen in Kosovo and then to attack us with brutality, that is, even with the overthrow of the autonomy of 1974.

* However, we are forced to ask you, did you think in 1981 that Kosovo will come to the position it is in today, that is, in 1994, practically under Serbian military administration and reoccupied?

Hoxha: No, I did not think or believe that one day we will come to where we are even then. So, in 1981 I had hope that the democratic forces, not only in Serbia, but also in Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro and Slovenia, would not allow the escalation of Serbian nationalism, primarily towards Kosovo. Otherwise, I have to say that at the beginning of 1981, at the level of the Presidency of the former Yugoslavia, and continuously in the state and political structures of Serbia, there was a demand that military administration be established in Kosovo. These requests had not passed to the Yugoslav Presidency, until Serbia defeated them all.

The political ruptures related to Kosovo and Serbian hegemonic goals started after the Serb from Vojvodina, Boshko Krunic, came to head the former LKJ. The leadership of Vojvodina, after the death of Stevan Doronjski, a high-ranking Yugoslav leader, began to play tricks, make intrigues with Serbia and support it in its goals towards Kosovo.

EDUARD KARDELI SUPPORTED THE SERBIAN HEGEMONIST POLICY AGAINST KOSOVO

* In 1981, the Serbian leadership, even Drazha Markovic personally, had requested the imprisonment of you, Xhav Niman and Mahmut Bakalli. Were you afraid of imprisonment?

Hoxha: I was not aware that Drazha has officially requested our imprisonment and I do not exclude it from now on, but at that time I was not afraid of my eventual imprisonment. In fact, immediately after the end of the war, 1945, I was afraid that the Serbian and Yugoslav leadership could stage some event to imprison me and then liquidate me. Especially in the 50s, I was afraid that the Serbs might arrest me and send me to the border with Albania, kill me, and then call my father and brothers to tell you that they allegedly caught me fled to Albania!?

But my fear that I might be imprisoned has remained many years later. Even today, I have concerns that various Serbian paramilitary groups may capture me and send me to Qafë e Prushi or Qafë Morinë, border with Albania, and liquidate me!

* Did you have a preliminary agreement with Tito on the Constitution of 1974?

Hoxha: First, let me say that the entire Serbian leadership of that time was against the Kosovo Constitution of 1974, except for the Serbian politician, Bobi Milosavlević, who had supported us. As for Tito, I can say that we talked with him several times about the Constitution of 1974, but generally Tito left the issues of constitutional changes to Kardel, that's why we worked with him. The Slovenian politician, Eduard Kardel, in relation to the constitutional changes of 1974, was very cautious in relation to the interests of Serbia and in particular supported the damage of Kosovo's interest to the benefit of Serbia. So he was very cautious when it came to Serbia's aspirations and demands and positions, but in essence he supported rather than opposed those Serbian aims.

Kardeli, during the meetings with me and my complaints that he should be more persistent in opposing Serbian aspirations towards Kosovo, told me: "Fadil, we cannot confront Serbia on the issue of Kosovo. This is the biggest republic, this is the Serbian people!

But it was not only Kardeli who was a prisoner of the humiliating beliefs that Serbia is the largest Yugoslav republic. Other Yugoslav leaders also had this complex.

* Does this mean that in 1968, namely with the constitutional amendments of 1971, there was no real chance for Kosovo to gain the status of a republic in the former Yugoslav Federation, for which the then Albanian political illegality actively acted and worked in Kosovo and abroad?

I BELIEVED THAT THE ISSUE OF KOSOVO WILL BE SOLVED ONLY WITH UNION WITH ALBANIA, THIS IS WHAT I SAID TO BAKARIQ

Hoxha: No, with the constitutional changes of 1974, Kosovo could not gain the status of a republic within the Yugoslav Federation, but gained the status of autonomy. Serbia was the one that opposed without question the status of the republic for Kosovo, but in the talks with Tito and Kardel, they had promised me and guaranteed strong autonomy for Kosovo. Tito and Kardeli, who were also not for Kosovo a republic, told me in a meeting: "What do you need a republic for?" Be careful...". This is how Tito warned me.

Then, honestly, even we ourselves as the leadership of Kosovo were not so hot for the republic. This is also due to the fact that I and my colleagues were of the opinion that the issue of Kosovo is resolved only with the union of Kosovo with Albania and not with any status of the republic within the federation and the Yugoslav state!? Even then, I thought that with the republic of Kosovo we would have become a rival republic to Albania.

At that time, I remember that Vladimir Bakariqi, in a conversation with me, had given the idea like this: "Fadil, take the initiative and make Albania a republic of seven Yugoslavians". On that occasion, I strongly opposed such an idea, telling Bakariq (Croatian senior leader) that I never agree with such a project and request. I told Bakariqi that currently I also disagree with some political concepts in Albania, but sometimes, when the Albanian issue is resolved, i.e. the issue of Kosovo, which is among the key issues of our national issue, Kosovo will join Albania.

* Do you think that even Tito, who had personally given you so much authority to establish and develop cooperation with Albania, was able to think that one day Kosovo would join Albania?

TITO SAID TO THE GENERALS THAT IN THE EVENT OF A WAR IN THE REGION, ALBANIA WOULD BE YUGOSLAVIA'S ALLY

Hoxha: Yes, I think that Tito thought similarly, in a distant historical perspective. On one occasion when we had an important meeting of the Yugoslav leadership on the subject of national security and border protection, where Tito also participated, the main report was presented by the Croatian general, Ratko Bubanj, who elaborated on the topic of how we are threatened with danger through our neighbors, or in case of war. When the Croatian general finished his lecture, his exposition on the dangers of war that could threaten the former Yugoslavia, Tito said to him: "Bubanj, you have forgotten one of our allies in case of war"!? We all looked in amazement at what Tito was thinking, who was again taking the floor. He said: "Our other ally is Albania, which in case of war will rely on us and we on it." Bubanj apologized, saying that in this sense he really did not consider Albania as an ally.

After 1981, our situation worsened. I was in the Yugoslav Presidency for three years, but in my time the Serbs and their allies demanded that a dictatorship and military administration be established in Kosovo, a request which, however, did not pass, despite the high degree of Serbian and Yugoslav state violence against the people of Kosovo. In addition to the Serbian leadership and their representatives in the former Yugoslav Federation, the establishment of administration and military dictatorship in Kosovo was sought and supported by Lazar Kolishevski, Vidoje Zharkoviqi, who initiated the issue of using the Albanian flag, and several others.

But even Tito has always been in favor of a more moderate attitude towards Serbia. At that time there was a lot of political speculation, which after 1981 was launched by the anti-Albanian and pro-Serb Lazar Kolishevski (high Macedonian leader) that: The weaker Serbia, the stronger Yugoslavia. By this I do not mean that Tito was afraid of Serbia, but nevertheless he felt that he too had to be careful in relation to Serbia. Now it is seen that it was not easy even for Tito to stay in power for 50 years and maintain balance. In fact, until Albania broke up with Yugoslavia (1948), we in Kosovo had few problems, but then the situation worsened. I think that the Albanians in Kosovo and in the former Yugoslavia could have passed more easily, if the Albanian-Yugoslav relations had not been broken. So, as if we had normal interstate relations everywhere.

* In an earlier conversation, we mentioned the fact that in a meeting of the Yugoslav Presidency, information was given about the murder of the brothers Gërvalla and Kadri Zeka?

WHAT WAS SAID ABOUT THE GARVALLA BROTHERS AND WHAT ARE THE EVIDENCES AGAINST ALI SHKURI

Hoxha: When it comes to the murder of the Gërvalla brothers and Kadri Zeka, I was there and I am sure that the UDB of Yugoslavia killed them. It is true that in a meeting of the former Yugoslav Presidency, where I also participated, the former Federal Secretary of Internal Affairs, Franjo Herlević, gave information about the alleged murder of the Albanian political emigration among themselves. Likewise, when talking about the murder of Enver Hadri, I think he was killed by the UDB. Otherwise, Enver and his father were shot by the UDB.

* Were there cases when in the period after 1981 you offered to resign?

Hoxha: I talked about my resignation, in 1981, with Dushan Dragosavc (Serbian representative of Croatia in the Yugoslav Federation). He opposed my idea, telling me plainly: “Yes, can't you see that they are waiting for you to resign. Don't be crazy." About my resignation, which was requested by Serbia, I also talked with Cvijetan Mijatović (representative of Bosnia in the Yugoslav Federation), who also opposed my intention. However, I raised the issue of my resignation at a meeting of the Yugoslav presidency, pointing out that my resignation and my responsibility regarding the events of 1981 in Kosovo are being talked about more. My resignation was not approved…

* A few years after your retirement, the Yugoslav party leadership set up a special commission for your responsibility. There is evidence that among the most vocal, critical and harshest witnesses against you, in the conversations with the members of the respective commission, was Ali Shukria, who was the only one who did not allow his testimony to be recorded...?

Hoxha: Ali Shukria owes me a lot, but... Immediately after the war, we had a testimony of an Albanian who lived in Turkey and who gave a statement to the UDB, regarding Ali Shukria's activities. That person is called Rafet Brica, from Mitrovica. Brica, therefore, gave testimony according to which Ali Shukria cooperated with the Gestapo and shot an Albanian from Mitrovica after the liberation. Rafet Brica has stated that Alia may have shot the person from Mitrovica, to prevent him from testifying about Ali Shukri's actions, which he knew about.

Since on this occasion the work of the Yugoslavian Party Commission was mentioned about my responsibility, I must say that in my speech before the commission I had to defend myself, because I was heavily accused of defamation and speculation. Indeed, if I had known that it would be like this, as it is today in 1994, I would certainly have drafted my defense differently, because I was accused of anti-Serbian politics. Otherwise, I was demoted during the war, in 1944 when I was the commander of the Operational Headquarters of the UNC of Kosovo. They changed our main headquarters without asking us and made a decision to attach it to Serbia, that is, they put it under the command of the SHO of the UNC of Serbia. Meanwhile, as the commander of the SHO of Kosovo, I have never participated in the meetings of the Operational Headquarters of Serbia and I have never referred.

When in 1945 they came from Serbia to Kosovo with three headquarters, they told us that they had come to clear Kosovo of ballistic missiles, and in this time of military administration, they told every Albanian that he was an "enemy". The military administration was established in Kosovo without my knowing anything. I was informed by Milladin Popovici. On the eve of the war, meanwhile, when we raised the issue of Kosovo, they told us: wait, let the war end and then we will see. The war ended and the situation only got worse. In fact, I have always been in favor of union with Albania, determined for this political course, convinced that it is the only real solution to our national issue. Yes, if I hadn't had such a strong belief in communist justice, I certainly wouldn't have been able to play the role I played, nor would I have endured all that I endured. I have made great strides in this story of mine, primarily from the Serbian accusations.

* Since you returned to the war, then allow me to remind you that you were the one who last communicated with Shaban Polluzha, after he made the decision not to go to the front of Srem...? What can you tell us about this situation, after which the attack of the partisans on the Shaban Polluzha Brigade suddenly began?

FADIL HOXHA'S LAST CONVERSATION WITH SHABAN POLLUZHA

Hoxha: Shaban Polluzha was a peasant with honest patriotic ambitions whose voice had already been heard in Drenica. In the meantime, it is known that people were gathered in his brigade to go to the front of Srem, a request we had made in order to avoid any outbreak of war in Drenica. I myself went to Drenica and gave a speech, but bearing in mind Tito's words that it should be possible to testify for the anti-fascist war even to those who until then did not have the opportunity.

The Srem front was the best case for those members. Shaban Polluzha himself and other fighters close to him agreed with this plan. After Shaban Polluzha's Brigade arrived in Podujevë, the issue started to boil within the brigade itself. One of the fighters asked the question: "Why are we leaving Drenica, while the Czechs are wreaking havoc on the civilian population?" It is true that I spoke for the last time with Shaban Polluzha, while he was in Podujevë and I was in Pristina. Shabani, among other things, said to me very worried: "Fadil, they are not listening to me". I then said to him: "Go yourself, Shaban!" And he replied: "I'm leaving..."!

After a while he came on the phone again and said: "Comrade Fadil, they are not listening to me and I have no path to set off on my own without them." Shaban, in my last communication with him I informed him that this will create problems not only for Shaban, but also for Drenica, besa and for Kosovo in general.

* Historical chronicles prove that partisan units were the first to attack the Shaban Polluzha Brigade...?

YES, HAKI TAHA KILLED MILLADIN, THERE WERE ALSO PLANS TO SPLIT ALBANIA

Hoxha: Yes, yes, that's true. It was a war, and you don't have a lot of wishful thinking there.

* Is it true that Miladin was killed by Haki Taha?

Hoxha: Yes, Haki Taha killed Miladin Popovic. I knew Haki from the school desks, because we were at school together. He was always a sworn nationalist, an ardent patriot. He was sick with tuberculosis...

* Do you share the opinion that if Albania did not join the anti-fascist war, it could be divided...?

Hoxha: This is more than certain because there were concrete plans, even during the Second World War, for Albania to be divided between Greece, Serbia...

* Furthermore, there are not enough archival documents to assess the role and attitude of Enver Hoxha regarding the Kosovo issue?

Hoxha: I think that Enveri was able to do at least more for Kosovo, even though we have to admit that he had a very difficult situation in his own Albania. Enver Hoxha had as his strong political opponent the bloc led by Koçi Xoxe, who was directly connected to Aleksandër Ranković, the first man of the Yugoslav UDB and the number two politician in the former Yugoslavia, until his fall in 1966.

* In the spring of 1945, you led a delegation during the visit to Albania and on that occasion you also met with Enver Hoxha?

THE MEETING WITH ENVER HOXHA AND THE SPYING TELEGRAM OF KOCI XOXE – THE MAN OF RANKOVIC...?

Hoxha: It is true that I had gone to Albania with Zekeria Rexha and some other friends, in 1945, to look for textbooks, Albanian letters and printing presses. On that occasion in Tirana, I met face to face with Enver. I told Enver about the difficult position in which the people of Kosovo found themselves immediately after the end of the war. I told him openly that during the war we fought with the national flag, they had even put the national symbol on the cell phone and now we are being banned from using the flag. I informed Enver that now they are calling us a national minority and that all the slogans written during the war, which, among other things, read "Long live Shqipnia", "Long live Enver Hoxha", etc. they are redeeming them according to the orders of the police and popular power. I also told him that innocent Albanians are being killed day and night, being declared as enemies and criminals. We, I repeated once again to Enver, entered the war in order to unite and now we are told that this is not possible.

* How did Enver Hoxha react?

Hoxha: Enver listened to me the whole time and trying to calm me down, he told me that we should raise the issues in the party and not give rise to the reactionary and charged forces in the former Yugoslavia and Serbia regarding the Kosovo issue. He mentioned several times "in the party, in the party", so that for a moment I was forced to tell him that we are putting them in the party, but they are not going well. I informed him that we need moral support from the leadership of Albania and personally from him, apostrophizing that materially we were better than them.

I returned from Albania satisfied with the conversations. Two or three days did not pass and I was called to the Committee, in the then capital of Kosovo in Prizren. Those from the committee told me that a telegram has arrived in the name of Spasoje Gjakovic regarding your stay, your visit to Albania. When I went to the committee, they told me that Spasoje Gjakoviqi received a telegram from Aleksandër Rankoviqi. Actually, Koçi Xoxe had sent a telegram to Ranković before. My friends told me the content of the telegram that Koçi Xoxe had sent to Ranković, who then gave explanations to Spasoje Gojković. It turned out that Xoxe had reported point by point our conversation between me and Enver.

* How did you act in that case?

Hoxha: I had nothing to hide. I told my friends and Gjoka Pajkovic, who was interrogating me about this case, about what I talked about and what I asked from Enveri. I told Gjoka that all this is correct, that I talked with Enver as a friend talks to a friend, as two war leaders talk, with the same ideals. I told him that I have always spoken openly about mistakes, failures. Gjoka Pajkoviqi looked at me sternly and said: "Fadil, you shouldn't have spoken like that in Tirana, because Albania is another country." I told Gjoka Pajkovic that Albania is not another country for me and I have never thought of it as such, even though it really is an independent country. I told him that I was called to Rankoviqi twice with reference to the situation in Kosovo and both times I also talked about our weaknesses and failures. Therefore, I told the Malaysian leader, I talked with Enver as I talked openly with Rankovic and as I am talking to you now. Gjoka couldn't get rid of his bitterness, so he told me: "Let it be like this, but let it be known that Albania is another country and that you should not talk to Enver about sensitive issues."

After the conversation with Gjoka, I thought a lot and remembered that I have discussed all of them one-on-one with Enver, so who could tell so precisely what I said...? How was it possible that Belgrade, before I arrived in Prizren, knew about the content of the conversation. Even then, I was of the opinion that this was done by Koçi Xoxe, who since then, not even Enveri had under his control, but Rankoviqi... /Telegrafi/