US State Department documents, published in 2023 (compiled and edited by Melissa Jane Taylor). Other documents that coincide with Albania in the compilation Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe, can be found at this link: Documents 424-429Meanwhile, the documents on Yugoslavia, some of which are also related to the situation in Kosovo, are at this link: Documents 186-256The translated memoranda below relate to Leka Zogu's meetings with several National Security Advisors of US President Ronald Reagan.
Selected by: Bejtullah Destani
Translated by: Enik Pogaçe
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1981–1988, VOLUME X, EASTERN EUROPE[1]
424. Memorandum of Understanding
Washington, March 20, 1981, 5:15–5:45 p.m.
Subject
Summary of the National Security Advisor's meeting with Leka I (Confidential)
PARTICIPANTS
Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
James W. Nance, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Janet Colson, Executive Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Paula Dobriansky, National Security Council Staff Member
Leka I of Albania
Abedin Mulosmanaj, Minister of the Court
Admiral Nance opened the meeting by asking Leka I to provide an overview of his current situation and his views on the current Albanian regime. (Confidential)
Leka I emphasized that, after his father’s death in 1961, he became the leader of the Albanian exile network led by his father. Thus, in the mid-1960s, he began coordinating liberation efforts both at home and abroad. He traveled widely and eventually settled in South Africa. One of his main achievements, he said, was the formation of the Military Council for the Integration of Albanians. Leka I went on to describe Albania’s current regime under Enver Hoxha as unstable, citing the country’s severe economic difficulties. Furthermore, he added that Albania’s internal situation had been worsened by Hoxha’s poor health, which had precipitated a struggle for succession. (Confidential)
In light of Albania’s current internal situation, Leka I claimed that he could overthrow the current regime in a short period of time and with minimal international repercussions. However, to do so, he stated that he would need to secure moral and psychological support from the US. He mentioned that the previous administration had asked Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states not to support Leka’s operation, and as a result, their assistance had been withheld. Therefore, Leka I urged the United States to change this policy. He stated that his organization has the manpower, the penetration capabilities, and even a military base, so they do not require material support from the US, only moral support and a clear signal to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States to financially support his operation. (Confidential)
Admiral Nance asked him what the consequences and reactions expected from Eastern Europe would be if Albania were liberated. (Confidential)
Leka I replied that he did not foresee any negative consequences, since Albania was geographically and ideologically isolated, and the Soviet Union was currently preoccupied with the Polish crisis. He added that possible intervention by Yugoslavia was impossible due to its internal problems. Furthermore, he stated that, although the Albanians in Kosovo desired liberation and hoped to be reunited with their homeland, they would not revolt at the same time. He said that he particularly wanted to dispel our fears of immediate destabilization in Yugoslavia due to the liberation of Albania. Leka I also mentioned that a change of government would be favorable to the United States, since Albania would allow the use of its four ports.
At this moment, Richard Allen arrived and, after greetings, asked Leka I for an overview of Albania's positioning, communications, and trade.
Leka I characterized Albania as an “orphan of the communist world,” as it had severed political ties with the Soviet Union and China. Regarding Albania’s communications, Leka stated that there were air flights from Belgrade and Athens to Tirana. He also mentioned that Albania’s main trading partner was Yugoslavia.
Allen then asked Leka I about his liberation strategy, the time frame, the amount of financial support he needed, whether South Africa had offered any assistance, how long this effort had been going on, and what kind of governance he envisioned for Albania.
Leka I replied that his network has been operational since 1965-66. They have drawn up eight different plans to instigate an internal revolution in Albania within 2–3 months or over the next 1–2 years. However, there is a need for a catalyst within Albania. He mentioned that he would soon be moving to Egypt, which would put him closer to Albania and help him better assess their various options and determine a possible catalyst. Furthermore, he said that this would make it easier to contact their military base in the Middle East, where they are training special teams to invade Albania. From a financial point of view, Leka I stated that he had not received any help from South Africa, but due to Albania's 75 percent Muslim composition, financial assistance was provided by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. He estimated that they needed $20 million, with a reserve of $XNUMX million, to successfully implement their operation. However, he emphasized that this did not constitute their current operating budget. Finally, Leka declared that the future governance of Albania would be determined by a referendum. So, whether Albania would become a republic or a monarchy would depend on the Albanian people.
Richard Allen further asked Leka I how well known he was, what was the exact number of his supporters, and what would be the impact of this liberation movement in Yugoslavia. (Confidential)
Leka I asked the Minister of the Court to answer the first question. (Confidential)
Mulosmanaj stated that Leka is well known and respected among Albanians. (Confidential)
Leka I then refused to reveal the exact number of his supporters for security reasons. However, he went on to state that the claim that a liberation of Albania would cause an explosion of the situation in Yugoslavia and bring in the Russians is wrong. On the contrary, he stated that the Albanians in Yugoslavia would remain calm and would not revolt. [Less than two unclassified lines]. However, he again requested a response from Mr. Allen regarding our possible support. (Confidential)[2]
Richard Allen replied that Leka I will receive a response. (Confidential)
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1981–1988, VOLUME X, EASTERN EUROPE
425. Memorandum from William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Allen)[3]
Washington, April 10, 1981
Subject
Help requested by King Leka I of Albania
King Leka wants us to ask the Saudis to provide him with $20 million to help finance the liberation of Albania. I recommend that we tell him that we do not consider it to be in the national interest of the United States to do so.[4]
I had a long conversation with Leka, consulted with a CIA expert on Albania, and carefully considered the situation before reaching this conclusion. Leka is a charming and persuasive advocate for his cause, which, in isolation, is undoubtedly just. (Also, I recall that Richard Bissell[5] was reported as a very persuasive advocate for the Bay of Pigs invasion.)
Without a doubt, no European country has been more oppressed by communism and deserves liberation more than Albania, the last bastion of Stalinism. From a human rights perspective, we must do everything to revive freedom in that tragic country. Unfortunately, there are other prevailing factors that led me to the negative conclusion:
– Albania is the most anti-Soviet country in Europe. Our strategic interest in that country is tied to its key position at the entrance to the Adriatic. While the Tirana leadership is also anti-US (and anti-capitalist in general), I find it hard to believe that the Albanians would try to deny NATO forces access to the Adriatic in the event of an actual or threatened conflict. For one thing, they hardly have the capabilities to do so. They still have two Soviet submarines that they retained when they expelled the Soviets in the early 1960s, but nothing else.
– Leka responds to this by insisting that a liberated Albania (supported by NATO) could more effectively resist a Soviet invasion. Maybe, but also maybe not. If Leka’s efforts fail – as I believe they will – the chances of bringing Albania closer to the West will become even smaller. No one would benefit from this.
– I cannot believe that a serious attempt to liberate Albania would not have an impact on the rebellious Albanians under Belgrade rule. Despite Leka’s claims, no operation in Albania can be separated from the possible consequences in Yugoslavia and even in Bulgaria. As you know, Belgrade has had serious problems with the Albanian province of Kosovo. If Yugoslavia were located on the Iberian Peninsula, I would enthusiastically promote further unrest and instability in that country; however, given Yugoslavia’s precarious geographical location, we have an unwelcome interest in its stability. If it were to fragment, can you guess who would try to pick up the pieces?
– Despite the lack of direct US support or funding for the Leka project, I have little confidence that our indirect role will remain secret. For example, how can we be sure that our positive outlook on a liberation effort will not be used to inspire those invited to risk their lives in this effort? (“Allah and Reagan are on your side!!”) The news of US involvement in Albania is something we don’t need right now. Look at the protest and the noise around El Salvador.
– How will this affect our relations with the Saudis? If we ask them to support Leka, we will be politically obligated to them. I would prefer to take their funds for UNITA or some other cause – if we wanted to follow this indirect path.
– Last, and perhaps least important, I do not think Leka’s plan has any chance of success. Despite the mountainous terrain that favors guerrilla activities, they will have to face the strictest security in Europe, if not the world. Guerrilla movements, in my opinion, cannot be completely successful against a well-integrated and determined army. (So far, they have only been successful against demoralized and disbanded regular forces.) Leka thinks he can convince part of the army to desert. I think he is dreaming. Even if Leka were to succeed, I do not believe it is worth the trouble for all the reasons mentioned above.
RECOMMENDATION
To contact King Leka I and tell him that we are not willing to contact the Saudis on his behalf.[6]
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1981–1988, VOLUME X, EASTERN EUROPE
426. Memorandum from William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Allen)[7]
Washington, April 15, 1981
Subject
King Leka
King Leka called today and I carefully told him that we had carefully studied his request and had decided against the approach he recommended – that is, to ask the Saudis to financially assist his project to liberate Albania. He then asked me if this meant that we would discourage “them” (the Saudis) from approaching us. I replied that this was not the decision he had requested (he did not dispute this point) and that I would have to take another look at this latter scenario; however, I told him that we had fundamental problems with the whole project. I went on to explain that, while we appreciated his personal commitment to his cause, he should understand that we had a number of other factors to consider in making our decision. (I did not tell him who made the final decision.)
King Leka seemed resigned to my answer, which he probably expected, and asked if it would be okay for him to contact me or Bud Nance in the future. I told him that would be fine, of course, but that it might be better if he just contacted me. (I tried to spare Bud from the numerous calls I was getting from His Majesty.)[8]
I have a lingering concern about the phone exchanges I had with the King: the high probability that our calls were being monitored by the Soviets here. I tried to stay away from specifics, but the Soviets can put two and two together, especially since I had control over only one side of the conversation. I told Leka that our calls were probably being monitored, which made him quite wary.
/Telegraph/
___________
[1] Source: Reagan Library, Paula J. Dobriansky Files, Country Files, Albania 1981–1982. Confidential. Compiled March 26. The meeting took place in Room 375 of the Old Executive Building.
[2] The last sentence was written in a messy manner by an unknown hand.
[3] Source: Reagan Library, Paula J. Dobriansky Files, Country Files, Albania 1981–1982. Secret. Sent for action. “RVA has seen” is stamped in the upper right corner of the memorandum.
[4] In the section next to this paragraph, Colson wrote: “A little different from what you told us. JC.”
[5] Deputy Director for Plans at the Central Intelligence Agency during the Kennedy administration.
[6] Nance wrote a note to Stearman under the recommendation, “Bill-Ask to call me. Bud.” Allen checked the “Approve” option and wrote, “Wait until he calls. Then decline him gently. RVA 4/14.”
[7] Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council Country File, Europe and the Soviet Union, Albania (20/03/1981–27/12/1982). Secret. Sent for information. In the upper right corner of the memorandum is stamped “RVA has seen.”
[8] Nance wrote in the margin next to this sentence, “Excellent!”
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